The time requisite for obtaining a certified copy of the decree or order minus the time consumed by appellant's own default for not having the decree or order drawn up should only be excluded in computing the period of limitation.

( 1 ) ON the application of respondent No. 1 (hereinafter referred to as the petitioning creditor), Datta J. made an order, dated June 24, 1966, for the winding-up of the applicant-company, Bangeswari Cotton Mills Ltd. , under the provisions of the Companies Act.

( 2 ) THE applicant states that on June 29, 1966 (not June 24, 1966, as wrongly stated in paragraph 21 of the petition), the court clerk of the applicant's then solicitor, Messrs. T. C. Roy and Co. , applied for certified copy of the judgment as well as of the order. He did not, however, at that time, put in the requisition for the completion of the order under the mistaken belief, as the court clerk said, that the solicitor for the petitioning creditor must have put in the requisition. On August 5, 1966, the said court clerk made enquiries about certified copies and came to learn that nobody having had made any requisition for the drawing up of the order the same was not drawn up and as such certified copies were not ready. The court clerk of Messrs. T. C. Roy and Co. has filed a supporting affidavit in corroboration of the above , atement by the applicant.

( 3 ) THE applicant-company obtained a change of attorney in the meantime and their new solicitor put in a requisition for the drawing up of the order, on August 10, 1966, with the leave of the court.

( 4 ) ON the same day, the applicant's solicitor took out a notice of motion, inter alia, praying for leave to file the memorandum of appeal without the certified copy of the order, upon the undertaking to file the same as soon as obtained ; for condonation of the delay in submitting the requisition for drawing up of the order; if necessary for extension of the time to file the appeal ; for inteyim injunction and for other reliefs.

( 5 ) ON behalf of the petitioning creditor it was contended that the appeal was barred by limitation and sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal within the prescribed period of limitation had not been made out.

( 6 ) NOW, under article 117 (sic.) of the Limitation Act, 1963, the period of limitation for preferring an appeal from a decree or order of any High Court to the same court is ninety days from the date of the decree or order. Under Rule 2, in Chapter XXXI of the Original Side Rules, the memorandum of appeal is to be accompanied by a copy of the decree or order appealed from. Section 12 of the Limitation Act, dealing with the exclusion of time in legal proceedings, provides for exclusion of the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the decree or order appealed from and reads as follows :" (1) In computing the period of limitation for any suit, appeal or application, the day from which such period is to be reckoned, shall be excluded. (2) In computing the period of limitation for an appeal or an application for leave to appeal or for revision or for review of a judgment, the day on which the judgment complained of was pronounced and the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the decree, sentence or order appealed from or sought to be revised or reviewed shall be excluded. (3) Where a decree or order is appealed from or sought to be revised or reviewed, or where an application is made for leave to appeal from a decree or order, the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the judgment on which the decree or order is founded shall also be excluded. . . . . . . . . . . . . Explanation.--In computing under this section the time requisite for obtaining a copy of a decree or an order, any time taken by the court to prepare the decree or order before an application for a copy thereof is made shall not be excluded. "

( 7 ) RELYING upon Sub-section (2) of Section 12, read with the Explanation, it was contended on behalf of the applicant that the applicant was entitled, after the making of the application for a certified copy of the order on June 29, 1966, to the exclusion of the time to be taken by the court in preparing the order and also the time to be consumed in