The "period of eighteen months" referred to in the proviso to Section 14 (3) of the Rent Control Act of 1950 is any period between the commencement of the Act and the institution of the suit, excluding the pre-Act period and the post-suit period.

( 1 ) THIS Second Appeal is directed against an appellate decree of ejectment from a shoproom in the groundfloor of a certain building at Strand Bank Road. The defendant was a monthly tenant under the plaintiff in respect of the said shop room at a rental of Rs. 130/3/6 per month. The trial Court dismissed the suit but, on appeal, it has been decreed. Hence this Second Appeal by the unsuccessful defendant.

( 2 ) THE property originally belonged to the plaintiff's brother Amulya Kanjan Dey, under whom the defendant occupied the suit premises as the tenant. The dispute between the parties, namely, the plaintiff and the defendant and between Amulya and) the defendant, started a long time back and there were various proceedings, but, for my present purpose, it is sufficient to refer to the following facts:

( 3 ) ON 12-8-1949 Amulya sold the suit premises to the plaintiff. The defendant was then depositing rents with the Bent Controller in the name of Amulya because of disputes with him. On 18-3-1950 Amulya wrote to the defendant intimating the transfer and asking him to pay damages thereafter to the vendee, the present plaintiff. A letter of confirmation also followed from the plaintiff herself and it was duly received by the defendant. The latter, however, continued to deposit rent with the Rent Controller in Amulya's name.

( 4 ) ON 16-9-1950 the plaintiff instituted Suit No. 6592 of 1950 in the Court of Small Causes, Calcutta, for recovery of arrears of rent from Chaitra 1356 B. S. to Aswin 1357 B. S. The suit was contested but, eventually, it was decreed on 11-2-1951 and the defendant paid the decretal amount to the plaintiff. Thereafter, the defendant continued to send rents to the plaintiff by postal money order and the same were duly received by the plaintiff.

( 5 ) ON 2-1-1952, corresponding to 17th Pous 1358 B. S. , the plaintiff served upon the defendant a notice to quit, asking him to quit and vacate the suit premises on the expiry of Magh 1358 B. S. and upon his failure to do so, she brought the present suit on 19-2-1952, corresponding to 6th Fal-goon 1358 B. S. It appears, however, that, even subsequent to the institution of this suit, she received rents from the defendant for Falgoon 1358 B. S. to Chaitra 1359 B. S. by money orders.

( 6 ) THE suit for ejectment was instituted on two grounds under the Rent Control Law, namely, (i) plaintiff's reasonable requirement of the suit premises for her own use and occupation and (ii) default on the part of the defendant in the payment of rent. The first ground has been concurrently negatived by both the courts below and it has not been pressed here on behalf of the plaintiff-respondent. On the second! ground, the courts below have differed in their opinion, the trial court holding that the defendant was not a defaulter, so as to be hit by the proviso to Section 14 (3) of the Act, the lower Appellate Court holding the contrary. The trial Court, however, felt no necessity to pass any order under Section 14 (1), as it was of the opinion that the suit would fail on the broader ground of waiver of the notice to quit. On this question of waiver also, the lower Appellate Court has reversed the trial court's decision.

( 7 ) THE points, therefore, that require consideration are (i) whether the proviso to Section 14 (3), Rent Control Act of 1950 applies to the present case and (ii) whether there was waiver of the relevant notice to quit. In my opinion, the first or these two points should be answered in the affirmative and the second in the negative, the result being that the decree for ejectment, passed by the learned Special Bench would be affirmed.

( 8 ) THE defaults found, and that finding Is unassailable on the materials before me, are for the period Chaitra 1356 B. S. to Kartick 1367 B. S. In view of the two letters, dated 18-3-1950 and 19-3-1950 respectively, from Amulya and the present plaintiff to the defendant, there is little room for doubt that the