JUDGMENT :

Harish Tandon, J.:

1. The scope of the instant appeal which was within the limited contour have been expanded by the eloquence of the Counsel for the appellant inviting the attention of the Bench to various provisions of the Acts, Rules and Ordinance in order to buttress the contention that the chargesheet issued by the Vice-Chancellor is bad, illegal and without jurisdiction.

2. A prelude to the litigation can be seen from the fact that the University decided to initiate a disciplinary proceeding against the appellant alleging misconduct and the charge-sheet was issued by the Vice-chancellor, which is assailed by the appellant/petitioner before this Court. The Single Bench dismissed the contention of the petitioner that the charge-sheet suffers from serious infirmities and/or illegalities but kept all the points, which was agitated by the appellants, open for the decision of the enquiry officer and further liberty was granted to the appellant to challenge the entire disciplinary proceeding at the appropriate stage including challenging the charge-sheet on the same grounds which have been urged in the instant writ petition.

3. According to the learned Advocate for the appellant, the charge-sheet notice issued by the Vice-Chancellor is infirm, bad and illegal in view of the provision contained under Uttar Banga Krishi Viswavidyalaya Act, 2000. In order to further the aforesaid submission, reliance is placed upon Clause (l) of Sub-Section (1) of Section 11 of the said Act which gives power to the executive Council to approve the recommendation for appointment of the officers, teachers and the non-teaching staff in the manner prescribed. Taking clue therefrom, it is sought to be contended that the moment the appointing authority is the Executive Council, the Vice-Chancellor is denuded of power to issue a show-cause notice or initiate a proceeding thereupon for the simple reason that he being not the Executive Council, cannot usurp the power in absence of any statutory provisions.

4. Mr. Mishra, the learned Advocate appearing for the appellant further relies upon the provision contained under Section 26 of the said Act which confers power upon the Vice-Chancellor to take any action in emergency, which in his opinion, called for immediate action but such action is required to be approved by such authority or the body which would further be evident from Sub-Section (7) of Section 26 thereof where the Vice-chancellor shall only give effect to the orders of the Executive Council regarding appointment, suspension and dismissal of the officers, teachers and other employees of the university.

5. According to Mr. Mirsha, the conjoint reading of the aforesaid subsections leaves no ambiguity that the Executive Council being the appointing authority is regarded as disciplinary authority and any action initiated in contemplation of the disciplinary proceeding can only originate from the Executive Council. Even if the Vice-Chancellor exercises such emergency power, all such actions are required to be ratified and approved by the Executive Council. In this regard, it is submitted that since there is no approval or the ratification and/or vetting by the Executive Council, the entire action is per se illegal.

6. According to Mr. Mishra, the other provisions contained in Sections 35 and 40 also corroborates the stand that the Executive Council is an appointing authority and the terms and conditions of the service in relation to the teacher has to be prescribed by the said Council and, therefore, the Vice-Chancellor cannot usurp such power. By referring to Section 51 of the said Act, Mr. Mishra submits that the power to make first statute is vested upon the State Government and in exercise of such power, the first statute was enacted on April 30, 2001. Mr. Mishra refers to Section 2 (b) of the first statute defining the appointing authority as the Executive Council of the University and, thus, the Vice- Chancellor cannot act as an appointing au