IMPORTANT POINT
The absence of a time limit in a decree allows the decree-holder to execute it at any time, emphasizing judicial interpretation favoring the decree-holder's rights.

JUDGMENT :

(Apurba Sinha Ray, J.)

By filing the instant application the decree-holder has prayed for necessary leave to the decree-holder to deposit a sum of Rs. 1,50,048/- before the Original Side in view of the relevant judgment and decree passed in suit no. 258 of 1992, and further for granting leave to the judgment-debtor no. 2 to withdraw the said sum as deposited by the decree-holder in compliance of the terms of decree dated 30th July, 2007. The decree-holder has also prayed for certain directions upon the Taxing Officer of the Original Side as mentioned in the master summons.

2. Mr. Jishnu Choudhury, learned counsel appearing for the decree-holder has contended that by virtue of the decree, the decree-holder is entitled to deposit the relevant sum before this court since there is no time limit imposed upon the decree-holder to deposit the said sum of money. According to him on payment of money by the plaintiff/decree-holder, the judgment-debtor no. 2 is to transfer the relevant shares and debentures to the decree-holder and further to record the name of the decree-holder in the relevant documents. Learned counsel has further argued that though the decree was passed on 30.07.2007, and the present execution case was filed on 12.08.2022, still the instant proceeding is not barred under the provisions of Limitation Act since the decree does not provide the time limit for payment of such amount. The relief granted to the decree-holder in the relevant proceeding is that of a perpetual injunction and the decree is enforceable only when the decree-holder makes the payment. It is also argued that as no time was fixed for paying the money the decree-holder can pay the said sum of money at any point of time. In this regard the learned counsel has referred to the judicial decisions reported at AIR 1974 Allahabad 275 (Abdul Rashid v. Sri. Sitaramji Maharaj Brajman and Ors.), AIR 1974 Calcutta 246 (Ramnath Das & Ors. v. Saha Chowdhury and Co. Ltd. & Ors.). The learned counsel also argues that if the decree is capable of two interpretations, the interpretation in favour of the decree-holder is to be accepted. He relies upon the judicial decision reported at (2000) 6 SCC 259 (Deep Chand Ors. v. Mohal Lal).

3. Mr. Pratik Ghosh appearing on behalf of the judgment-debtor no. 2 has started his argument by saying that these are the shares of judgment-debtor no. 2 Grasim Industries Limited over which the decree-holder and the judgment-debtor nos. 1 and 3 are fighting with each other. Admittedly the judgment was passed against the judgment-debtor no. 1 Jiyajeerao Cotton Mills Limited which was gone into liquidation in the year 1998. The suit was filed in the year 1992 but no leave for proceeding against the judgment-debtor no. 1 under section 446 of Companies Act, 1956 was obtained by the decree-holder. There is nothing on record to show that such leave was ever granted. Learned counsel has also submitted that judgment-debtor no. 2 has already filed one supplementary affidavit contending that 500 shares were lying with the Investor Education and Protection Fund (IEPF) and the supplementary affidavit also contains the transaction history. If there is any claim of the decree-holder, the same can only be raised against the judgment-debtor no. 1. Learned counsel for the judgment-debtor no. 2 has also submitted that the shares lying in IEPF may be transferred to the decree-holder subject to the order of this court. Learned counsel has also placed before the court the relevant page of GA application wherein the amount has been admitted by the decree-holder. Learned counsel has also drawn the attention of this court to the page no. 207, Volume 2 wherein it has been mentioned that shares have been sold to Citi Bank from the part of the judgment-debtor no. 1.

4. Learned counsel Mr. Pravat Kumar Srivastava appearing for the judgment-debtor no. 3 namely Citi Bank has submitted that the instant proceeding has been barred under the provisions of Limitati