JUDGMENT :

1. This matter was mentioned to be taken up out of turn citing an urgency.

2. The appellant invited the attention of the Court that pursuant to an order of the executing court Sheriff has gone to the decretal property and intended to take possession thereof and unless there is an order staying the process of execution passed by this Court it would virtually render the instant appeal infructuous. We directed the appellant to serve a notice upon the respondent and fixed the matter today so that the issue raised in the instant matter can be conveniently decided in presence of both the parties.

3. At the time of hearing the counsel appearing for the respective parties and the point urged in the instant appeal, we feel that it would be an idle exercise to keep the appeal pending as the documents which are available on record are sufficient enough to decide the core issue involved in the instant appeal.

4. The instant appeal has been filed impugning the judgment and order passed by the trial Court on an application under Order 12 Rule 6 of the Code of Civil Procedure. A little prelude to the disputes between the parties is required to be adumbrated. The salient facts which emerge from the records that the plaintiff/respondent filed the suit for recovery of possession in respect of the suit property treating the defendant/appellant as a trespasser having lost their right, title and interest to remain there on applicability of the definition of a tenant enshrined under section 2(g) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1997.

5. It is a suit for eviction simpliciter against a person who allegedly could not qualify the definition of a tenant given under section 2(g) of the said Act and not a suit where the eviction is sought on one or more grounds enumerated under section 6 of the said Act.

6. An application for judgment upon admission under Order 12 Rule 6 of the Code of Civil Procedure was taken out by the plaintiff/respondent alleging that the defendants/appellants unequivocally and clearly admitted that the tenancy stood in the name of their mother who expired on 3rd November, 2009 and, in view of the provisions contained under Section 2 (g) of the Act, he cannot be regarded as a tenant and his status became that of a trespasser and, therefore, a decree for eviction should be passed on such admission.

7. On the other hand, the defendants/appellant contend that such factum cannot be construed as an admission on their part as initially the said tenancy stood in the name of their father who expired on 6th July, 1970 and the law operating in the field at the relevant point of time does not create any distinction over the heritability of the tenancy and, therefore, all the heirs including the widow of the deceased tenant succeed the said tenancy as joint tenants. It is, thus, submitted that even if the tenancy was granted in the name of the widow i.e., the mother of the present defendant/appellant, it was all along intended the said tenancy as the joint tenancy of all the heirs of the original tenant (since deceased) and, therefore, the death of the mother does not affect the rights accrued in the year 1970. It is further contended that in a suit pending before this Court, the receiver had been appointed who collected the rent all along and the defendants/appellants continued in discharging its obligation by paying the rent to the receiver and, therefore, there is no jural relationship of landlord and tenant between the respondent and the present appellant.

8. It would be relevant to record the facts discerned from the stand of the respondent that the suit in which receiver was appointed was filed in relation to the installation of the fire fighting equipment and other related issues not in relation to a dispute amongst the directors or the shareholders of the respondent-company. It is, thus, cannot be construed that the said receiver usurped the right of the landlord or the owner but such arrangement was made for a limited purpose