Delay in seeking judicial relief can bar claims, especially when the claimant has accepted the status quo for an extended period.

JUDGMENT :

Md. Shabbar Rashidi, J.

1. The appeal is in assailment of judgment and order dated February 07, 2024, passed in WPO No. 729 of 2017.

2. By the impugned judgment and order the learned Single Judge, dismissed the writ petition filed on behalf of the appellant writ petitioners on the ground of delay in approaching the court. Learned Single Judge also observed that in the writ petition, the writ petitioners had not challenged the decision of the KMC authorities dated 6th June, 2017 rejecting the prayer of the petitioners to grant pay protection in order to bring pay parity in between the petitioners and the Respondent no.9.

3. It was contended on behalf of the appellants that there was factually no delay in approaching the court. Learned Single Judge erred in holding that the appellants filed the writ petition with a delay of more than 5 years. The appellants also disputed the finding of the Learned Single Judge to the effect that the cause of action arose in the year 1996. It was submitted that although, the disparity in the pay packet of the writ petitioner and Respondent No.9 arose in 1996, the writ petitioners preferred representation against such disparity contemporaneously. However, the representation of the appellants was disposed on June 06, 2017 and thereafter; the writ petitioners approached the court with a writ petition which culminated into the impugned judgment and order. Therefore, such approach by the appellants cannot be said to be belated.

4. It was also submitted that the authorities acted in utter violation of Article 14 of the Constitution of India by negating the claim of the writ petitioners for pay parity in accordance with Regulation 34A of Central Civil Service Regulations and Circular No. 74 dated January 31, 1985. Such claim could not have been rejected on the ground of delay. In support of their contentions, the appellants relied upon (1974) 1 Supreme Court Cases 317 (Ramchandra Shankar Deodhar & Ors v. The State of Maharashtra & Ors), (1974) 3 Supreme Court Cases 91 (Haryana State Electricity Board v. State of Punjab and Others) and (1989) 1 Supreme Court Cases 546 (P.L. Shah v. Union of India and Another).

5. It was further submitted that the higher pay granted to Respondent No.9 was possibly because of the fact that he was enjoying higher pay in the post of welfare officer as he was accommodated to the post of assistant manager on the post of welfare officer being abolished, was not sustainable. It was contended that since the post of welfare officer was abolished and Respondent No. 9 was accommodated in the post of assistant manager, he could not have brought forward his previous scale of pay for determination of fixation of his pay in the cadre of assistant manager. It was further submitted that the appellants as well as Respondent No. 9 were simultaneously promoted to the post of deputy manager and as such, they should have been granted similar pay in the promotional post. As such, the appellants were entitled to pay protection as against the pay as fixed for Respondent No. 9.

6. It was further contended that after the revision of pay and immediately prior to the promotion of the appellants, Respondent No. 9 was getting a pay at par with appellant No.2 whereas appellant No.1 and 3 were getting slightly less than the pay of appellant No.1. Respondent No.9 was junior to the appellants and as such, the appellants were entitled to pay protection in terms of the provisions of regulation 34A read with circulars dated January 31, 1985 and August 29, 2007. In support of such contention learned advocate for the appellants relied upon All India Reporter 1987 SC 537 (Comptroller and Auditor General of India, Gian Prakash, New Delhi & Anr. v. K. S. Jagannathan & Anr.) and All India Reporter 2010 SC 1955 (Secretary, Cannanore District Muslim Educational Association, Kanpur v. State of Kerala & Ors).

7. On the other hand, learned advocate for KMC submitted that the appellants have filed the instant writ pet