1945 Supreme(Cal) 146
CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Khundkar, J., Biswas, J.
Satyanarayan Banerji & Anr. - Appellant
Versus
Kalyani Prosad Singh Deo Bahadur & Ors. - Respondent
Decided On : 28-05-1945
Headnote:
Receiver - Execution of Mortgage Decree - Order 21, Rule 90, Section 47, Civil P.C. - The court held that the receivers, appointed in a separate suit, were not parties to the mortgage suit and therefore lacked locus standi to object to the execution of the decree under Section 47. The court also found that the receivers' application to set aside the sale under Order 21, Rule 90 was time-barred. The court further clarified that the appointment of a receiver under Order 40, Rule 1, Civil P.C. does not vest the property in the receiver, and the receiver is not a representative of any party to the suit.
Fact of the Case:
The appellants, joint receivers appointed in a separate suit for dissolution of a partnership, objected to the sale of mortgaged properties held in execution of a mortgage decree. The receivers were not parties to the mortgage suit, but the decree-holders had obtained leave to add the then receiver as a party to a previous execution proceeding. The current execution proceeding was initiated after the previous one was dismissed for non-prosecution.
Finding of the Court:
The court found that the receivers lacked locus standi to object to the execution of the decree under Section 47 of the Civil P.C. as they were not parties to the suit. The court also held that the receivers' application to set aside the sale under Order 21, Rule 90 was time-barred. The court further clarified that the appointment of a receiver under Order 40, Rule 1, Civil P.C. does not vest the property in the receiver, and the receiver is not a representative of any party to the suit.
Issues: Whether the receivers, appointed in a separate suit, had locus standi to object to the execution of the mortgage decree under Section 47 of the Civil P.C. and whether their application to set aside the sale under Order 21, Rule 90 was time-barred.
Ratio Decidendi: The court held that the receivers were not parties to the suit and therefore lacked locus standi to object to the execution of the decree under Section 47. The court also found that the receivers' application to set aside the sale under Order 21, Rule 90 was time-barred. The court further clarified that the appointment of a receiver under Order 40, Rule 1, Civil P.C. does not vest the property in the receiver, and the receiver is not a representative of any party to the suit.
Final Decision: The court dismissed the appeal, holding that the receivers' objections to the execution of the decree were not maintainable.
JUDGMENT
Biswas, J. - This appeal arises out of certain proceedings in execution of a mortgage decree, and is directed against an order of the Subordinate Judge of Asansol, dated 12th June 1942, in Miscellaneous case NO. 106 of 1941, dismissing the appellants' objections to the sale held in execution of that decree. The mortgagors were two persons, S, H. Seddon and Rasaraj Biswas, who carried on business in co-partnership under the name and style of S. H. Seddon & Co., but they are not the appellants before us. The appellants are two joint Receivers of the said partnership business the assets of which included the mortgaged properties, having been appointed as such in a suit on the Original Side of this Court for dissolution of the partnership. The objections raised to the sale were partly under Order 21, Rule 90, and partly u/s 47, Civil P. C. In-so far as they fell under the first category, the learned Judge held that they were time-barred, and also that the appellants had failed to substantiate them, while as regards the other objections, he held inter alia that the appellants had no locus standi to maintain the same, as they were neither parties to the suit nor their representatives within the meaning of Section 47 of the Code. In the result, he dismissed the objections in their entirety.
2. The material facts of the case may be shortly stated: On 31st March 1921, the mortgagors abovenamed, S. H. Seddon and Rasaraj Biswas, executed a mortgage in favour of Mugniram Bangur and Kedar Nath Daga for a sum of Rs. 10 lakhs in respect of their 14 annas interest in certain coal lands in the districts of Manbhum and Burdwan, stipulating to pay interest at the rate of 7 per cent, per annum with six-monthly rests. By an indenture of the same date they also assigned their remaining 2 annas interest in the properties to the mortgagees. On 4th September 1922, the mortgagees instituted a suit in the Court of the Subordinate Judge of Asansol to enforce the mortgage, and also for a declaration of their title to the 2 annas share which had been assigned to them. On 3rd July 1923, a preliminary decree was passed in the suit for a sum of Rs. 10,64,296-3-0, including interest and costs, on the basis of a compromise, one of the terms of which was that the name of defendant 2, Rasaraj Biswas, should be expunged from the record and the suit dismissed against him. As a result, the decree was made only against the other defendant, S. H. Seddon. The plaintiffs' title to the 2 annas share was also declared as claimed.
3. Meanwhile, it appears that on 24th March 1923, while the mortgage suit was pending, one Sasthi Kinkar Banerjee instituted a suit on the Original Side of the High Court (Suit No. 908 of 1923), claiming a 4 annas share in the partnership business of S. H. Seddon & Co., and praying for a dissolution of the partnership and for accounts. On 10th April 1923, a decree was made in the suit, also on compromise, by which the partnership was dissolved and accounts were ordered to be taken on the footing that Sasthi Kinkar Banerjee was entitled to the 4 annas share as claimed. By the decree certain persons were appointed joint Receivers of the partnership assets, which, as already stated, included the properties covered by the mortgage in favour of Mungniram Bangur and Kedar Nath Daga. The joint Receivers were these two mortgagees, besides one Satis Chandra Sen, a Solicitor of this Court, and two other persons, but it does not appear that the appointment of the mortgagees was made with their knowledge or consent. By a subsequent order made on 13th June 1923, the joint Receivers were in fact discharged, and in their place the said Satis Chandra Sen was appointed sole Receiver with the same powers and subject to the same conditions.
4. At the date of the preliminary decree in the mortgage suit, Satis Chandra Sen was accordingly in possession of the mortgaged properties as such sole Receiver, but he was not made a party to the decree. In the compromise