The main legal point established in the judgment is the application of the doctrine of res judicata between co-defendants and the binding nature of a decision in a representative suit.

JUDGMENT

1. The plaintiff Ram Lakhmi is one of the daughters of one Basiram Dhupi by his first wife. Defendant 1 Joy Lakshmi is Basiram's daughter by his second wife Mani Dhupini. Plaintiff's mother died first, then died Basiram in July 1904. Govinda Dhupi, father of defendants 2 and 3, was a brother of Basiram. In November 1904 Mani Dhupini executed a deed of partition in favour of Govinda admitting that the properties in suit belonged to Basiram and Govinda in equal shares. In 1917 defendant 1, Joy Lakshmi, instituted a suit in the Munsif's Court at Munshigunj, against Govinda and Mani and another person to whom Govinda had sold some of the properties; and she impleaded the plaintiff Ram Lakhmi in that suit as pro forma defendant. She alleged that Govinda had no share in the properties, that the deeds of partition and sale were fraudulent and collusive and that the same were not binding on her. Govinda's defence in that suit was that he had an 8 annas share in the properties and the deeds challenged were valid and operative. The plaintiff Ram Lakhmi did not enter appearance as a party in that suit, but figured as a witness therein, and in the deposition that she gave she supported Govinda's defence. The Munsif on 28th November 1917 passed a decree in that suit in these terms:

The disputed land is declared to have been included in the estate of Basiram Dhupi and the deed of partition executed by defendants 1 (i.e. Mani) and 4 (i.e. Govinda) are declared not to be binding on the plaintiff (i.e. Joy Lakshmi).

2. Mani Dhupini died in 1925. Earn Lakshmi then instituted the present suit against her stepsister Joy Lakshmi as defendant 1, Govinda's sons as defendants 2 and 3 and certain other persons who are transferees of some of the properties from Govinda or his sons as the other defendants.

3. The suit has been decreed by the Court below. Defendants 2 and 3 are the appellants in this appeal.

4. The question which arises in this appeal is whether the question of the title of Govinda in the properties in suit is barred by res judicata by reason of the decision in the previous suit to which reference has already been made. The Subordinate Judge has held that it is so barred.

5. The identity of the properties involved in the two suits is not disputed and we are satisfied that it is only by reason of their value having increased in the interval that elapsed that the present suit was no longer entertainable in the Court of the Munsif and so had to be instituted in the Subordinate Judge's Court. The present suit therefore was entertainable by the Munsif's Court at the date of the previous suit. It has been held by this Court that this is sufficient to meet the] requirements of the expression: "Court competent to try such subsequent suit": Gopinath v. Bhagwat [1884] 10 Cal. 697. The appellants' contention that the incompetency of the Munsif's Court to entertain the present suit would bar the application of the doctrine of res judicata must therefore be overruled. The Subordinate Judge says;

I hold that as between defendants this suit would be governed by the principles of res judicata in virtue of the decision in. the previous suit and all the defendants would be bound by it, and I would find that Govinda had no right and title to the lands in suit; there was no legal necessity to bind the estate.

6. The appellant challenges the correctness of this view. In the recent decision of the Judicial Committee in the case of AIR 1931 114 (Privy Council) their Lordships have approved of the dictum acted upon by Courts in this country that to apply the doctrine of res judicata as between co-defendants three conditions are requisite: (1) there must be a conflict of interest between the defendants concerned; (2) it must be necessary to decide this conflict in order to give the plaintiff the relief he claims; and (3) the question between the defendants must have been finally decided. This decision is also an authority for the proposition that if these condi