JUDGMENT

Costello, J. - This is an application made by Kali Charan Dhur, one of the defendants in this administration suit. The decree directed the plaintiffs and the defendants Nobin Chandra Dhur and Susila Sundari Dasi to pay to the applicant Rs. 2,590-5-3 with interest thereon from the date of the decree until realization. The application is for the execution of that decree under the provisions of Order 21, Rule 11, Civil P.C. and is in the tabular form required by that rule. In Col. 10 the applicant states:

I, the applicant pray that the said sum of Rs. 2,590-5-3 with interest thereon at 6 percent, per annum from the date of the decree till realization and the costs of taking out this execution be realized by attachment and sale of the right, title and interest of the judgment-debtors to and in the immovable properties specified at the date of the application and paid to him.

2. The tabular statement was duly filed before the Master under Ch. 6, Rule 12, of the Rules of the Court and as the decree was more than a year old the matter fell to be dealt with under the provisions of Order 21, Rule 22 and the Master endorsed the tabular statement in this way:

Let usual notice issue under Order 21, Rule 22. (a), Civil P.C.

3. The notice was duly issued and WAS dated 8th May 1928. It is to be observed that the decree was made on 8th May 1916 and the notice was dated 8th May 1928, that is to say, exactly twelve years after the date of the decree. u/s 12(1), Limitation Act, in computing, the period of Limitation, the day from which such period is to be reckoned is excluded. If therefore it can be said that the filing of the tabular statement was itself " an application" then the application was made just within the period of limitation prescribed by Article 183, Schedule 1, Limitation Act.

4. Section 3, Limtation Act, is first section in " Part 2 " of the Act which " Part " bears the heading " Limitation of Suits, Appeals and Applications," so that there are three species of matters which are dealt with in the Limitation Act and the schedule to that Act. Section 3 reads as follows:

Subject to the provisions contained in Sections 4. to 25 every suit instituted, appeal preferred, and application made after the period of limitation prescribed therefor by the Schedule 1 shall be dismissed.

5. Upon looking at Article 183 we find that that is one of the articles in the division of the schedule which deals with "Applications " and the heading of the Col. 1 is " Description of application," that of Col. 2 "Period of Limitation ", and that of Col. 3 " Time from which the period begins to run." Reading Article 183 in conjunction with Section 3 the provisions of the Statute relating to limitation of the kind applicable to the present instance may be stated to be as follows:

Subject to the provisions contained in Sections 4 to 25 every application to enforce a judgment, decree or order of any Court established by Royal Charter made after the period of 12 years shall be dismissed.

6. Therefore it is quite obvious that what has to be considered is whether or not the " application " in the present matter was or was not made after the period of 12 years from the date of the decree.

7. It was argued by Mr. Chatterjee on the authority of the cases of Monohar Das v. Futteh Chand [19031 30 Cal. 979 and Amulya Ratan Banerjee and Others Vs. Banku Behari Chatterjee, AIR 1925 Cal 668 that it is not sufficient merely that an application should be made but that some order should be made by the Court. In my view these decisions do not go so far as to lay down the proposition that the article requires the making of an order in execution in Jorder that the rights of the decree-holder should be preserved, except no doubt in cases where a question arisen as to whether or not there has been a rivivor within the meaning of Clause 3, Article 183. To my mind in order to preserve the rights of the decree-holder it is only necessary that he should make an application within the