SupremeToday Landscape Ad
Back
Next
Judicial Analysis Court Copy Headnote Facts Arguments Court observation
Listen Audio Icon Pause Audio Icon
judgment-img

2025 Supreme(Cal) 712

IN THE HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA
SABYASACHI BHATTACHARYYA, SUPRATIM BHATTACHARYA, JJ.
Smt. Mithu Ghosh And Others – Appellant
Versus
XXXXX – Respondent 
FMAT 412 of 2025 IA No: CAN 1 of 2025 
Decided On : 12-11-2025

Advocates Appeared:
For the appellants : Mr. Pinaki Ranjan Mitra

Court clarified that under Section 8 of the 1956 Act, prioritizing the welfare of minors allows the natural guardian to enter agreements for property with prior court permission, ensuring any benefits support the minors' needs.

Headnote:(A) Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956 - Section 8 - Transfer of property of minors - Appeal admitted due to arguable questions - Trial Judge's rejection based on insufficient details for proposed agreement - Court emphasized the need for demonstrating legal necessity and evident advantage for minors. (Paras 2, 5, 12, 22)

(B) Legal Necessity - Court's role limited to determining necessity or advantage for minors, without detailed scrutiny of proposed transaction - A mother's unemployment and the minors' educational needs indicate necessity. (Paras 11, 20, 22)

(C) Development Agreement - Prior permission from court required before entering into any transaction - Permitted to enter into agreement for minors' property with safeguards to ensure benefit for minors. (Paras 23, 25)

Facts of the case:
Appellant mother sought permission to enter into a development agreement for property owned by her and her two minor children after their father’s death. The application was dismissed due to lack of sufficient proof of necessity and details of the proposed agreement.

Findings of Court:
The Trial Judge’s reasoning was flawed; necessity was established based on the appellants' financial situation, allowing the mother to enter into the agreement for the welfare of her children.

Issues: Whether the need for legal necessity was adequately demonstrated for granting permission to transfer minor's property and whether the scope of judicial scrutiny was correctly utilized.

Ratio Decidendi: The court determined the Trial Judge had an overly stringent interpretation of legal necessity; established that the appellant's lack of income created immediate need, thus justifying the proposed transfer for minors' welfare.

Result: Appeal allowed, permitting mother to enter into the development agreement.

Table of Content
1. admittance of appeal due to arguable questions. (Para 1 , 2)
2. trial judge's rejection of application based on lack of details. (Para 3 , 4 , 5 , 6 , 7)
3. background on appellants' financial situation and property. (Para 8 , 9 , 10)
4. necessity for development agreement for minors' welfare. (Para 11 , 12)
5. court's limited duty in approving guardian's acts under section 8. (Para 13 , 14 , 15 , 16 , 17 , 18 , 20)
6. court's role is to ascertain legal necessity and advantages. (Para 19 , 21)
7. legal necessity evident due to absence of income for the family. (Para 22 , 23)
8. error in law by trial judge in dismissing the application. (Para 24)
9. judgment in favor of appellants allows development agreement. (Para 25 , 26 , 27)

Judgment :

Sabyasachi Bhattacharyya, J.

1. In view of arguable questions being involved, we admit the appeal on the grounds taken in the memorandum of appeal.

2. Since there is no scope of service of notice, as the litigation is not adversarial in view of the nature of the same, having arisen out of the refusal of an application under Section 8 of the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956 (for short “the 1956 Act”), seeking leave to transfer the property of minors, we take up the appeal itself for hearing.

3. By the impugned order, the learned Trial Judge rejected an application filed by the present appellants, whereby the appellant no.1-mother sought to enter into a development agreement in respect of the property, of which the appellant no.1-mother and her two minor children, being appellant nos. 2 and 3, are co-owners.

4. The primary premise of the rejection of the said application was that the details and particulars of the proposed agreement and/or transfer have not been furnished before the learned Trial Judge.

5. The learned Trial Judge observed that although there is no straitjacket formula to determine the criterion of “legal necessity” of a minor and it has to be interpreted and determined taking into consideration the factual aspect of each and every case independently, in the present case, the appellant no.1 has spent only a few lines to show the urgency and has failed to establish the legal necessity for developing the property for the welfare of the children.

6. The learned Trial Judge also observed that the daily family expenses and educational expenses of the minor children were also not disclosed but only the school identity cards of the children were produced to show the expenses of the minors.

7. The learned Trial Judge further observed that the current market value of the property, including the possible enhancement in the valuation of the property, was also not disclosed before the learned Trial Judge by the present appellants and, as such, the learned Trial Judge was apprehensive in granting blanket permission to the petitioner to enter into any development agreement representing the minors with regard to their respective shares without first settling the terms and conditions specifically as far as practicable, which is, according to the learned Trial Judge, completely lacking in the present case.

8. The brief facts of the case are that one Kartick Chandra Ghosh, along with his brother Lakshman Chandra Ghosh, were co-owners in equal shares of the subject property. On the demise of the said Kartick, his share, that is, fifty per cent of the property devolved on the present appellants, being respectively the widow and the minor children of the said Kartick.

9. As averred in the application under Section 8 of the 1956 Act, as well as before this Court, the appellant no.1 is unemployed and a housewife whereas the appellant nos. 2 and 3, her minor children, are school-going adolescents, respectively aged about 13 and 11 years.

10. Thus, it is clear from the averments in the application itself that the appellants have no source of income whatsoever. Even the learned Trial Judge did not cast any doubt on that aspect of the matter.

11. Thus, the over-reliance of the learned Trial Ju

Click Here to Read the rest of this document
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
Judicial Analysis

AI

SupremeToday Portrait Ad
supreme today icon
logo-black

An indispensable Tool for Legal Professionals, Endorsed by Various High Court and Judicial Officers

Please visit our Training & Support
Center or Contact Us for assistance

qr

Scan Me!

India’s Legal research and Law Firm App, Download now!

For Daily Legal Updates, Join us on :

whatsapp-icon Back to top