For offences of mischief and animal cruelty, the prosecution must demonstrate clear criminal intent or deliberate purpose. An accidental collision involving an animal, lacking任何 proof of malicious intent, motive, or specific knowledge of causing harm, cannot be legally characterized as a criminal act.

Judgment :

Dr. Ajoy Kumar Mukherjee, J.

1. The instant application has been preferred seeking quashment of GR Case no. 7201 of 2022, corresponding to Chatterjeehut Police Station Case No. 241 of 2022 under section 428/429 of IPC read with section 11(1) (a) of the Prevention of Cruelty to Animal Act, 1960 (in short Act of 1960). According to the FIR lodged by the complainant, a stray dog was run over on 04.12.2002 by a slow moving car, near 2/9 Olaibibitala Bylane, Howrah. The FIR emphasises deliberate cruelty by the petitioner.

2. Being aggrieved by the impugned proceeding, Mr. Mukherjee, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner submits that inordinate delay in lodging the written complaint has not been explained anywhere. The investigating authority recorded the statements of some persons under section 161 Cr.P.C., who stated before the investigating authority that the car approached at a slow pace and they are of the view that the driver specifically targeted the dog. But no other direct physical evidence has been cited to corroborate the belief.

3. He further argued that the offence under section 428 and 429 of the IPC are based on the concept of “mischief” as defined in section 425 IPC, which requires a wrongful or intentional destruction or diminution of public property. But public property in its statutory sense does not extend to a stray animal as it is neither owned nor controlled by any government authority or institution.

4. Furthermore FIR itself states that the car allegedly driven by the petitioner moved at a slow speed, through the L-Shaped blind corner at Olaibibitala Lane. Slow movement is inherently at odds with an intent to harm as any deliberate attempt to kill an animal would more likely involve higher speed or overt aggression. The absence of any motive or acceleration belies the theory of the intentional cruelty. In the present circumstances the dog’s presence in a blind spot and the slow maneuver by the driver, points more toward an unfortunate accident than criminal design. Accusations of intentional killing lost substantial credibility, when there is no conclusive proof showing of a fatal outcome. Lacking post incident evidence of death or injury casts serious doubt on the charge under section 429 IPC.

5. Mr. Mukherjee also argued that Section 11 (1) (a) of the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act requires proof that the accused caused unnecessary pain or suffering with intention or knowledge. In the instant case the complaint itself indicates a slow moving car that encountered the dog at an L-shaped bent, which suggests an accident rather than a deliberate plan to cause harm. If the dog merely failed to move away due to age or infirmity that is an unfortunate event but hardly indicative of cruelty or ill will. From the FIR and subsequent deposition, it is clear that the petitioner resides approximately 20 meters from the alleged spot. Therefore, the statement that the car had no business other than to kill the dog as alleged is untenable. This also undermines any claim of maliciously “arrived only to kill the animal” pointing instead to a normal commute.

6. He additionally argued, since the complaint acknowledges that the car moved slowly, which typically would afford an animal time to move or flee and if the dog failed to do so, due to old age or proper reflexes that does not translate into a willful act on the driver’s part to crush the animal. Without an