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2026 Supreme(Cal) 192

IN THE HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA 
SHAMPA DUTT (PAUL), J.
Bridge and Roof Company (India) Ltd. & Anr. – Petitioner
Versus
The Assistant Labour Commissioner (Central), Kolkata and Controlling Authority & Anr. – Respondent  
WPA 8484 of 2026 
Decided On : 24-04-2026 

Advocates Appeared:
For the Petitioner: Mr. Soumya Majumder, Ld. Sr. Adv. Mr. Sudarshan Kr. Agarwal Ms. Ditsha Dhar Ms. Debanjana Paul Mr. Sakshi Singh
For the Respondent: Mr. Balai Ch. Paul Ms. Tithi Roy

Where a party lacks knowledge of an administrative order due to a representative's negligence, a Writ Court may calculate the statutory limitation period from the date of actual knowledge to ensure fairness and uphold the principles of natural justice.

Headnote:(A) Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 - Section 7(7) - Limitation period for filing appeal - Writ jurisdiction under Article 226 - Condonation of delay - Principle of natural justice - Where a party remains unaware of an order due to the negligence or failure of their representative, the Writ Court, in the interest of justice, may treat the 'date of knowledge' as the commencement date for computing the statutory limitation period, particularly when the petitioner was deprived of an opportunity to contest the matter due to the conduct of their agent. (Paras 17, 21, 22)

(B) Writ Jurisdiction - Exercise of power - High Court exercises inherent power to ensure that a party is not prejudiced by the failure of legal representation - Where the petitioner had no knowledge of the proceedings before the authority, allowing a prescribed time for preferring an appeal is consistent with ensuring access to justice. (Paras 24, 25)

Facts of the case:
The petitioner challenged an order passed by the controlling authority, which resulted in a recovery certificate being issued. The petitioner contended that they were unaware of the proceedings and the subsequent order due to the negligence of the representative authorized to defend the case. Consequently, the statutory period for filing an appeal had expired, and the petitioner sought relief from the High Court to challenge the order on merits before the appellate authority.

Findings of Court:
The court observed that the principles of natural justice would be undermined if the petitioner were denied the right to appeal under circumstances where they were unaware of the initial order due to their representative's conduct. The court concluded that it was necessary to fix a specific 'date of knowledge' to enable the petitioner to pursue the statutory remedy.

Issues: The primary issue was whether the Writ Court could, in exercise of its jurisdiction, extend the limitation period for filing an appeal under the relevant statute when the petitioner was unaware of the impugned order due to the negligence of their authorized representative.

Ratio Decidendi: The court held that while statutory limitation periods are generally strict, the Writ Court possesses the discretion to interpret the commencement of limitation from the 'date of knowledge' if the petitioner remained unaware of the adverse order due to a genuine lapse by a representative, thereby serving the interest of justice and preventing a violation of natural justice.

Result: Writ application disposed of with liberty to the petitioner to prefer a statutory appeal within 30 days, with the date of limitation computed from the date of knowledge of the recovery certificate.

Table of Content
1. procedural context regarding the challenge of a gratuity order and limitation bars. (Para 1 , 2 , 3 , 4 , 5)
2. arguments concerning legislative intent, limitation strictness, and article 226 powers. (Para 6 , 7 , 8 , 9 , 10 , 11 , 12 , 13 , 14 , 15)
3. determining 'date of knowledge' to compute limitation period for filing an appeal. (Para 16 , 17 , 18 , 19 , 20 , 21 , 22 , 23)
4. granting liberty to prefer a statutory appeal and issuing interim protective orders. (Para 24 , 25 , 26 , 27 , 28 , 29 , 30 , 31 , 32)

JUDGMENT :

SHAMPA DUTT (PAUL), J.

1. The writ application has been preferred challenging the certificate dated 18th February, 2026 issued by the respondent no. 1 being the controlling authority herein, in file no. 48/06/2022-E3 and has prayed for quashing of the same along with an order dated 18th August, 2025 also issued by the respondent no. 1 the controlling authority.

2. Learned counsel for the respondent herein submits that the said order dated 18th August, 2025 is an appealable order. But as no appeal has been preferred by the petitioners till date, the same is barred by limitation and the period of limitation cannot be extended beyond the permissible limit as provided in the statute in the present case under Section 7(7) of the payment of gratuity act.

3. Learned counsel for the respondent has relied upon the following judgments:-

i. City College, Calcutta vs State of West Bengal and Ors. , decided on February 10, 1986.

ii. Ali Hossain vs M/s. Budge Budge Co. Ltd. & Ors. in FMA No. 3595 of 2015 decided on 13.07.2018.

4. The petitioner on the other hand has relied upon the following judgment:-

(i) City College, Calcutta vs State of West Bengal and Ors. , decided on February 10, 1986 (Para 3).

(ii) C.D. Steel Pvt. Ltd. vs Assistant Provident Fund Commissioner , 2019 SCC OnLine Cal 9277.

5. On hearing the parties and on perusal of the materials on record, it appears that admittedly the employee herein has already received the admitted amount of gratuity. It is for the balance amount that the order has been passed by the controlling authority.

6. Mr. Paul, learned counsel for the respondent relies upon Section 7(7) of the payment of gratuity act and submits that there is no scope for extending the period of limitation, beyond the period as provided under the statute/Act.

7. On the other hand, Mr. Majumder, learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioner submits that the petitioner is not at fault for not preferring an appeal within the statutory period in view of the following pleadings made in the writ application:-

“(i) During the course of the hearings before the respondent no. 1 authority, the petitioner company authorized one of its employees to take appropriate steps to defend such application. Accordingly he was taking all necessary steps. The petitioner company has placed their submissions vide a reply and other submissions to defend the interest of the petitioner company.

(ii)To the utter shock and surprise, the petitioners received a certificate issued under section 8 of the said Act of 1972 dated February 18, 2026 issued by the respondent no. 1 directing the respondent to pay a sum of Rs. 4,03,044/- (Rupees Four Lakh Three Thousand Forty-Four Only) to the respondent no. 2 along with 10% simple interest per annum w.e.f. 31/10/2016 till the actual date of payment plus 15% compound interest per annum w.e.f. 01/12/2016 till the date of recovery.

(iii) The petitioner company further learned that the said representative did not take the appropriate steps after the said order was passed by the respondent no. 1 authority and further the said representative failed to apprise the respondent no. 1 authority of the correct factual circumstances. Due to such major lapse on behest of the said representative, the petitioner company could not prefer an appeal against the said order dated August 18, 2025, within the time limit prescribed under Section 7(7) of the Payment and Gratuity Act, 1972. It is pertinent to

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