Deepak Gupta, J.

The following question has been referred to the Full Bench:

"Whether the proviso to Section 2(1) of the Act, 2006 is an absolute bar to entertain an appeal against an interlocutory order without considering the scope of the order and without considering whether the interlocutory order has decided the rights of the parties and has an element of finality attached to it?"

2. To appreciate the issue and the rival contentions of the parties, it would be appropriate to refer to Section 2(1) of the Chhattisgarh High Court (Appeal to Division Bench) Act, 2006 which reads as follows:

"2. Appeal to Division Bench of the High Court from a judgment or order of one judge of the High Court made in exercise of original jurisdiction. - (1) An appeal shall lie from a judgment or order passed by one judge of the High Court in exercise of original jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, to a Division Bench comprising of two judges of the same High Court.

Provided that no such appeal shall lie against an interlocutory order or against an order passed in exercise of supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India."

3. The issue raised before us is whether the proviso quoted hereinabove totally bars filing of appeals against all interim orders or not. Before dealing with the various authorities, we may point out that the provisions of this Act are identical to the provisions of the Madhya Pradesh Ucch Nyayalaya (Khand Nyaypeeth Ko Appeal) Adhiniyam (14 of 2006) (hereinafter called the 'MP Act'). The provisions of the MP Act have been considered by a Full Bench of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Arvind Kumar Jain v. State {AIR 2007 Madhya Pradesh 276}. This judgment is the sheet anchor of the arguments of those counsel who urged that the proviso does not bar filing of appeals against all interlocutory orders.

4. On the other hand, learned counsel for the Respondents, especially the learned Advocate General have contended that the language of the proviso is very clear. It is urged that the intention of the legislature is clear that it did not want to provide for appeals against interlocutory orders. It is further urged that when the statute creates a bar to an appeal against an interlocutory order by judicial interpretation, this Court cannot confer right of appeal.

5. In Shiv Shakti Coop. Housing v. Swaraj Developers {(2003) 6 SCC 659}, the Apex Court clearly held that the right of appeal is a statutory right. It has to be granted by statute and if no right is granted, then no appeal is maintainable. This view has been reiterated in Kamla Devi v. Kushal Kanwar & another {(2006) 13 SCC 295}.

6. The main part of Section 2(1) of the Act, 2006 creates a statutory right of appeal against any judgment or order passed by a Single Judge of this Court in exercise of his original jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India to a Division Bench. However, the proviso clearly provides that no appeal shall lie against an interlocutory order or an order passed in exercise of supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India.

7. Strong reliance is placed by the Appellants on the judgment delivered by the Apex Court in Shah Babulal Khimji v. Jayaben D. Kania {(1981) 4 SCC 8}. In this case, the question before the Apex Court was whether an order of the learned Single Judge refusing to grant injunction or to appoint a receiver, was appellable or not and whether an appeal lay against an order of the learned single Judge of the Bombay High Court to Division Bench of the said Court. In that case, the appeal filed before the Division Bench arose out of a civil suit filed on the original side of the High Court wherein the plaintiff had sought interim relief but the learned Single Judge dismissed the said application. It was held that this order was a judgment within the meaning of clause 15 of the Letters Patent of the Bombay High Court and therefore, an appeal was maintaina