JUDGMENT :

1. Heard Mr.Moolchand Jain, learned counsel for the applicant. Also heard Mr.Vikram Sharma, learned Deputy Government Advocate, appearing for the respondent.

2. Today is fixed for consideration of the interim prayer made by the applicant, as made in I.A.Nos.01 of 2022 in both the cases.

3. These Tax Cases have arisen on application(s) filed under Section 55 of the Chhattisgarh Value Added Tax, 2005 read with Section 13 of the Chhattisgarh Entry Tax Act, 1976.

4. Mr.Jain submits that the principal amount of entry tax has already been deposited and post-dated cheques towards payment of interest have also been delivered to the respondent. He submits that if the aforesaid cheques issued for payment of interest are allowed to be encashed, the petitioner will suffer irreparable loss and injury.

5. Mr.Sharma submits that in an application for reference such as under Section 55 of the Chhattisgarh Value Added Tax, 2005 read with Section 13 of the Chhattisgarh Entry Tax Act, 1976, this Court does not have jurisdiction to pass any interim order. To support the contention, he has relied on the decision rendered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Commissioner of Income Tax, Delhi v. Bansi Dhar and Sons, reported in (1986) 1 SCC 523 and has drawn our attention to paragraphs 40, 41 and 42.

6. At paragraphs 40, 41 and 42 the Hon’ble Supreme Court has stated as follows:

“40. It has to be borne in mind that in answering questions or disposing of references either under Section 66 of 1922 Act or Section 256 of 1961 Act, the High Courts do not exercise any jurisdiction conferred upon them by the Code of Civil Procedure or the Charters or by the Acts establishing respective High Courts. In respect of certain matters jurisdictions exercised by the High Court, must be kept separate from the concept of inherent powers or incidental powers in exercising jurisdiction under Section 66 of 1922 Act or 256 of 1961 Act. Section 66 of Income Tax Act of 1922 or Section 256 of Income Tax Act of 1961 is a special jurisdiction of a limited nature conferred not by the Code of Civil Procedure or by the Charters or by the special Acts constituting such High Courts but by the special provisions of Income Tax Act 1922 or 1961 for limited purpose of obtaining High Court's opinion on questions of law. In giving that opinion properly if any question of incidental or ancillary power arises such as giving an opportunity or restoring a reference dismissed without hearing or giving some additional time to file paper book, such powers inhered to the jurisdiction conferred upon it. But such incidental powers can not be so construed as to confer the power of stay of recovery of taxes pending a reference which lie in the domain of an appellate authority. Therefore, the concept of granting stay in a reference ex debito justitiae does not arise. That concept might arise in case of the appellate authority exercising its power to grant stay where there is no express provision. Ex debito justitiae is to do justice between the parties.

41. Rendering advice on the question of law referred to the courts has nothing to do with the recovery of taxes or granting stay in respect of the same.

42. Therefore, in our opinion it cannot be said that the High Court has inherent power or incidental power in the matter of a reference pending before it to grant stay of realisation or to grant injunction. That must remain within the jurisdiction of the appellate authority and pendency of a reference does not detract from that jurisdiction of the appellate authority. In our opinion, therefore, the High Court was in error in exercising its jurisdiction by passing an order for stay of realisation under section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure in a pending reference. The High Court could have exercised its power if the appellate authority had not properly exercised its jurisdiction, not in reference jurisdiction but by virtue of its jurisdiction under Article 226 or Article 227 in