ORDER :

1. Being aggrieved by the order dated 26.11.2022 passed by the Additional Sessions Judge, FTSC (POCSO), Korba in Special Case (POCSO) No. 44/2022 whereby, charge under sections 354, 354 (A), 354 (D) and 324 of the IPC and Section 8 of the POCSO Act has been framed against the applicant, this Revision has been preferred.

2. Learned counsel for the applicant submits that the charge framed by the trial Court is bad and contrary to law as there is no sufficient material available on record based on which the impugned order has been passed. He also submits that essential CCTV footage upon which applicant is relying has not been collected by the prosecution, therefore, at that time the applicant has filed an application under Section 91 of Cr.P.C. however, the trial Court not exercised its power under the aforesaid Section for summoning the material evidence. He also submits that the prosecutrix has demanded money from the applicant to taking back her complaint and in this regard applicant has made complaint before the Police on 16.03.2023. Learned counsel relying on the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Nitya Dharmananda alias K. Lenin and Another vs. Gopal Sheelum Reddy and Another, (2018) 2 SCC 93. He submits that order of the Court below suffers from material illegality therefore, this revision may be allowed and impugned order may be quashed.

3. On the other hand, learned State Counsel strongly opposes the submission and submits that the prosecutrix who is a minor girl aged about 14 years has categorically made allegation against the present applicant who is aged about 28 years that the applicant forcefully grabbed her hand and molested her by kissing and touching her body with ill intention. Therefore, necessary ingredients for framing of charge are available on record and only strong suspicion is sufficient for framing of charges, therefore, the Revision deserves to be dismissed.

4. On 30.06.2023, the prosecutrix along with her mother appeared before the Court through V.C. from DLSA Korba and raised strong objection in the matter.

5. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the revision.

6. In the matter of Dipakbhai Jagdishchandra Patel vs. State of Gujarat, (2019) 16 SCC 547, law relating to framing of charge and discharge was well discussed at Paras-15, 16 and 23 which read as under:

“15. We may profitably, in this regard, refer to the judgment of this Court in State of Bihar vs. Ramesh Singh, (1977) 4 SCC 39 : 1977 SCC (Cri) 533 : AIR 1977 SC 2018, wherein this Court has laid down the principles relating to framing of charge and discharge as follows:

“4.......Reading Sections 227 and 228 together in juxtaposition, as they have got to be, it would be clear that at the beginning and the initial stage of the trial the truth, veracity and effect of the evidence which the prosecutor proposes to adduce are not to be meticulously judged. Nor is any weight to be attached to the probable defence of the accused. It is not obligatory for the Judge at that stage of the trial to consider in any detail and weigh in a sensitive balance whether the facts, if proved, would be incompatible with the innocence of the accused or not. The standard of test and judgment which is to be finally applied before recording a finding regarding the guilt or otherwise of the accused is not exactly to be applied at the stage of deciding the matter under Section 227 or Section 228 of the Code. At that stage the court is not to see whether there is sufficient ground for conviction of the accused or whether the trial is sure to end in his conviction. Strong suspicion against the accused, if the matter remains in the region of suspicion, cannot take the place of proof of his guilt at the conclusion of the trial. But at the initial stage if there is a strong suspicion which leads the Court to think that there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence then it is not open to the Court to say that the