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2002 Supreme(Del) 1426

High Court Of Delhi
MUNICIPAL CORPORATION OF DELHI - Appellant
Versus
PRADIP OIL CORPORATION - Respondent
L.P.A. 53 of 1996
Decided On : 09/17/2002

Advocates Appeared:
B.B.JAIN, PRADIP NANDRAJOG

The main legal point established in the judgment is the distinction between lease and licence under the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act and the relevant provisions of the Transfer of Property Act and the Indian Easements Act.

Headnote:

lease - oil storage tank - Delhi Municipal Corporation Act - Section 2(3), Section 2(24), Section 119, Section 120(2), Section 123 - The court discussed the interpretation of the agreement for erection of oil storage tank and its classification as a lease or licence under the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act. It considered the definition of 'building' and 'land' under the Act, and the taxation of Union properties. The court also analyzed the distinction between lease and licence as per the Transfer of Property Act and the Indian Easements Act, and the legal principles governing the determination of lease or licence.

Fact of the Case:

The case involved the question of whether an agreement for the erection of an oil storage tank and related structures constituted a lease or licence under the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act. The respondent had been granted licences for maintaining a depot for storage of petroleum products, and the rateable value of the properties in question was being disputed.

Finding of the Court:

The court found that the oil storage tank would not be considered a building under the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, and the instrument had been executed on behalf of the President of India, which was termed to be a licence. The court also noted the difference in opinion in various judgments and ordered a larger bench to hear and decide the appeals.

Issues: The main issue was whether the agreement for the erection of an oil storage tank constituted a lease or licence under the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act. The court also addressed the conflicting judgments and the need for a larger bench to decide the appeals.

Ratio Decidendi: The court's decision was based on the interpretation of the relevant provisions of the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, the distinction between lease and licence as per the Transfer of Property Act and the Indian Easements Act, and the legal principles governing the determination of lease or licence. The court also considered the intention of the parties and the nature of the possession granted under the agreement.

Final Decision: The court referred the case to a larger bench for decision. The final determination of whether the agreement constituted a lease or licence was pending.

S. B. Sinha

( 1 ) WHETHER an agreement for erection of oil storage tank together with pump house, chowkidar cabins, switch room, residential rooms and verandah for storing oil decanted from the railway tankers, which bring petroleum products to the site at which they are decanted, would amount to lease or licence, is the question which falls for consideration in this batch of Letters Patent Appeals, which arise out of various judgments and orders passed by learned Single Judges of this Court.

( 2 ) THE said question arose in view of the orders passed by the Additional district Judge, Delhi in various house tax appeals filed under Section 169 of the delhi Municipal Corporation Act, (in short the Act) against the orders passed by the assessing Officers in terms whereof rateable value of the properties in question were enhanced on the ground that the said constructions do not come within the definition of "building" attracting house tax under the said Act.

( 3 ) BEFORE adverting to the question involved we may notice the basic fact of the matter. The respondent herein had been granted separate and distinct licences by the president of India acting through Superintendent of Northern Railway, Delhi for the purpose of maintaining depot for storage of petroleum products at a yearly licence fee of Rs. 20,640/- and Rs. 31,000/- per annum respectively.

( 4 ) THE properties in question were assessed at a rateable value which were sought to be increased. Objections thereto were filed by the respondents. A contention was raised that the storage tanks would not come within the purview of the definition of building as contained in Section 2 (3) of the Act and thus no tax would be leviable as provided under Section 114 of the said Act. In the said appeal the following questions were raised: (a) Whether such steel structures are buildings within the meaning of delhi Municipal Corporation Act or not? (b) Whether such structures can be termed as a land within the meaning of Delhi Municipal Corporation Act or not? relying on or on the basis of a judgment of Bombay High Court titled Indian Oil corporation v. Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay, 77 (1974) Bombay Law reporter 314, (decided by Justice Bhola and Makki, JJ.) dated 27/28th March, 1974, it was held that such structures are not building within the meaning of the said Act. It was held by the Bombay High Court:

"it is difficult to comprehend that anything which is resting by its own weight can ever be said to be attached to earth at all. It would not be correct to say that a light article would not be said to be attached to earth but a heavy article would be. I am unable to agree that the size and weight can determine the question attached to the earth or not. Attachment is a physical characteristic. It is the mode of manner of annexation or attachment that would be decisive. If some how it becomes a part or parcel of land then it is attached to the earth but not otherwise. We, therefore, hold that the six oil-storage tanks with which we are concerned cannot be described as "land" for the purpose of their rateability under the relevant provisions of the Bombay Municipal corporation. "

( 5 ) THE learned Additional District Judge also came to the conclusion that the respondent is not a person primarily responsible for payment of property tax within the meaning of Section 120 of the DMC Act, and thus the order of assessment impugned before him were held to be not sustainable.

( 6 ) THE appeals preferred by the respondent herein were therefore allowed by the learned Judge.

( 7 ) QUESTIONING the said orders writ petitions were filed by the appellant herein.

( 8 ) BEFORE adverting to the question involved in these appeals, we may notice the relevant provisions of the MCD Act.

"2 (3 ). "building" means a house, out-house, stable, latrine, urinal, shed, hut wall (other than a boundary wall) or any other structure, whether of masonry, bricks, wood, mud, metal or other material but does not includ























































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