( 1 ) THE meaning and effect of the word made in section 126 (4) of the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957 has given rise to these four petitions.

( 2 ) ALL the writ petitions relate to the same property owned by respondents 1 to 3 being property no. B-100, Malviya Nagar, New Delhi and rateable value has been fixed at different values w. e. f. 1. 4. 95, 1. 4. 96, 1. 4. 97 and 12. 6. 98 respectively.

( 3 ) THE factual matrix is very brief. The assessment order was passed on 15. 3. 1999 which was diarised in the despatch register on 31. 3. 1999 and was posted on 6. 4. 99. The question which arose for consideration before the appellate authority was whether the said order could be said to be made on or before 31. 3. 1999 in view of the provisions of section 126 (4) of the said Act. Section 126 (4) of said Act is quoted as under:-

126. Amendment of assessment list.-

(4)NO amendment under sub-section (1) shall be made in the assessment list in relation to- (a)any year prior to the year commencing on the 1st day of April, 1988, after the 31st day of March, 1991;

(B)THE year commencing on the 1st day of April, 1988, or any other year thereafter, after the expiry of three years from the end of the year in which the notice is given under sub-section (2) or sub-section (3), as the case may be;

( 4 ) LEARNED counsel for the petitioner has assailed the findings of the appellate authority to the effect that since the order was not received by the assessee before 31. 3. 1999, the order dated 15. 3. 1999 was time-barred. It may be also noted that subsequently the rectified order was passed on 5. 5. 2066 but since the same was a rectification of the order dated 15. 3. 1999, the same had to relate back to the said order.

( 5 ) LEARNED counsel for the petitioner has REFERRED TO to the judgment of the Supreme Court in Kumar Jagdish chandra Sinha (dead) through LRs. vs. Commissioner of income-tax, West Bengal AIR 1996 SC 1895 to contend that if the return is in the course of transmission before the expiry of the relevant period it is not necessary that it should also be received by the assessee within the said period.

( 6 ) IT was held that the said term does not mean presented but means and includes hearing and determination of the application for review of the judgment. It was held In re Manning 1885 30 Ch. D 480 that the order of the court is made on the date it is pronounced and not on the date it is drawn up.

( 7 ) LEARNED counsel for the respondents 1 to 3, on the hand contend that the expression made was interpreted in A. C. Arumugham and others vs. Manager, jawahar Mills Ltd. , AIR 1956 Madras 79. The said expression was interpreted in the context of Payment of wages Act and it was held that the term made has to be liberally construed as the date on which the order is communicated to the concerned party and the date when it reaches them. It may, however, be noted that while interpreting provisions of the said Act it was observed that the purpose of the Act is to provide that employed people should be paid their wages in particular form and at particular intervals and without any unauthorised deduction.

( 8 ) LEARNED counsel for the respondents 1 to 3 have also sought to rely on bye-law 9 of the Assessment list bye laws, 1959 dealing with the amendment to assessment list where it is stated that the assessment list shall be finally amended in accordance with the decision given . The contention thus raised was that section 126 (4) has to be given effect to in the context of the amendment to the assessment list under bye-law 9 (3) which uses the word expression given . It was thus contended that the word given and "made" both have the same meaning and reliance has been placed on the judgment of the Supreme Court in K. Narasimhiah vs. H. C. Singri Gowda in AIR 1966 SC 330 where it was held that giving is complete when it is tendered to the person concerned. Bye law 9 (3) is as under :-

9 (3) The assessment list sh