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2001 Supreme(Del) 45

High Court Of Delhi
INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AND INTELLIGENCE AGENCY LIMITED - Appellant
Versus
MUNICIPAL CORPORATION OF DELHI - Respondent
Interim Application 9207 of 1997
Decided On : 01/17/2001

Advocates Appeared:
APURAB LAL, K.S.Sidhu, Pardip Nandrajog, R.P.Bansal

Headnote:Arbitration Act, 1940 - Sections 14, 20, 31 & 34 — Award there under — For making rule of Court — Objections filed by MCD — Time barred — Legal questions raised with regard for filing objections — If objections are filed beyond the period of thirty days — It cannot be looked into — Court has no power to entertain an application Under Section 5 of Limitation Act — Court ought not to countenance an objection that has been raised after party has participated in the proceedings — Further held — Award need not to be reasoned unless required to do so — Dismissed.

       Limitation Act, 1963 - Section 5 and Article 119(b) — Arbitration award — Time limit for filing objections — Time barred objection — Held — Section 5 is not applicable — Delay in filing objection cannot be condoned for filing objection — Period is 30 days and not the three years — Application dismissed.

Vikramajit Sen

( 1 ) SUIT No. 569-A of 1997 has been filed for making the Award relating to case No. ARB/jc/1 dated 14/03/1997, passed by Justice Jagdish Chandra (Retd.) as Rule of the Court and for passing of a decree in terms thereof. The Respondent, the Municipal Corporation of Delhi (MCD) has filed Objections to this Award on 27/05/1997, in terms of their application numbered as IA. 9207/97. Both these actions shall be disposed off by this judgment. The Petitioner/claimant immediately raised the preliminary objection that this application cannot be considered on merits since it was barred by limitation. The averment is that the MCD was served with a copy of S. No. 569-A/1997, (being the petition under Section 14 of the Arbitration Act, 1940) through its Commissioner (Respondent No. 1) and its Commissioner (Slum and JJR) (Respondent No. 2) on 3/04/1997. While these averments have not been controverted by the MCD, it is their contention that the period of Limitation should be reckoned from 28/04/1997 on which date Respondent No. 3, i. e. Director (Administration) Slum Wing (Sandjj) had been served, and if so reckoned, the Objections filed on 27. 5. 1997 are palpably within time.

( 2 ) THE period of limitation is set down in Article 119 (b) of the Limitation Act, 1963, (corresponding with Article 158 of the earlier Limitation Act) which reads as follows: Description of suit Period of Limitation Time from which period begins to run For setting aside an award or Thirty days Date of service of getting an award remitted notice of filing of award for consideration Dr. K. S. Sidhu, Learned Senior Counsel who has appeared for the MCD raised a number of legal questions in his endeavour to show that the impugned Award should be set aside. His contentions are paraphrased as follows - (A) Proceedings under Section 20 partake of the nature of a suit and therefore the relevant period of limitation 4 not thirty days under Article 119 (b) of the Limitation Act, 1963 but three years under Article 137 of the Limitation Act. (B) The Reference to Arbitration under Section 20 was only an interlocutory order and could be varied at any time till the final stage of the passing of a judgment is arrived at. (C) Even if it is assumed that the Respondents were served on 3. 4. 1997, the Objections having been filed on 27. 5. 1997, a delay of only 24 days had occurred, which deserved to be condoned. (D) The Referral Order of this Court is only directional with respect to Shri S. S. Dhindsa. No reference had been made in respect of the 2nd Agreement dated 24. 1. 1992 and since it is well settled that parties cannot confer jurisdiction, that part of the Award which deals with this Agreement is void ab initio. If the Reference was de hors the Arbitration Clause, it was atonce improper. (E) It was incumbent on the Arbitrator to give reasons, and not having done so, the Award does not justify being made Rule of the Court. (F) The Award was published after the enforcement of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 and the procedural provisions contained therein, i. e. the giving of reasons, ought to have been adhered to.

( 3 ) DR. Sidhu, Learned Senior Counsel for the Respondents, relied on the following judgments;

1. State of Jandk and another v. Dev Dutt Pandit, AIR 1999 SC 3196. 2. Associated Engineering Co. v. Government of Andhra Pradesh and another, AIR 1992 SC 232. 3. Prasun Roy, v. The Calcutta Metropolitan Development Authority and another, AIR 1988 SC 205. 4. M/s. New Model Industries Ltd. v. Union of India, 1999 (51) DRJ 759. 5. Swaran Arora and Anr. v. Sh. Shyam Lal Jain and Ors. , 1999 V AD (Delhi) 755. 6. Prem Sagar Chawla v. Messrs Security and Finance (P) Limited and another, AIR 1968 Delhi 21. 7. Abdul Kadir Shamsuddin v. M. P. Oka and another, AIR 1955 NUC (Bombay) 5316. 8. Madan Lal v. Sunder Lal, AIR 1967 SC 1233. 9. Kiran Singh and others v. Chaman Paswan and others, AIR 1954 SC 340. 10. Hira Lal Patni v. Sri Kali Nath, AIR 1962 SC 199. 1


















































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