(JUNE 1, 2001) 2001 (TLS)125178

2001-DLT-94-337 :: 2001-AD (Del)-5-504

INDRAPRASTHA MEDICAL CORPORATION LIMITED Vs. Government of the National Capital Territory of Delhi

VIKRAMAJIT SEN

( 1 ) THE short and interesting question that has arisen in these writ petitions is whether the Industrial employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946, (hereinafter referred to as the said Act ) is applicable to the hospitals. If it is so enforceable. Section 3 of the act mandates the employer of the industrial establishment to submit its draft standing orders to the certifying Authority. Thereupon, after giving the employer and representatives of the employees a hearing, the Authority is required to propose modifications or additions thereto, if the need is felt. Thereafter, the authority is to certify the draft. One of the petitioners, namely, Indraprastha Medical Corporation ltd. (which along with other Hospitals is collectively referred to as the Hospital ) is "presently adhering to its own Standing Orders, and has resolutely refused to submit them for certification under the Act. In its letter dated 11. 7. 2000 the Government of National capital Territory of Delhi directed the Hospital to submit five copies of its Standing Orders for certification. Several reminders were sent by the government with the consequence that the Hospital filed writ Petition 4499/2000 for quashing the order dated 11. 7. 2000. The stand of the Hospital is that it is not an industrial establishment ,as contemplated in the said Act and hence it cannot be compelled to submit its extant Standing Orders for the imprimatur of the certifying Authority.

( 2 ) TO resolve this controversy we need to travel on the long and winding road from the said Act, past the payment of Wages Act, 1936, and thence on to the factories Act, 1946. The itinerary carries on to the indian Railways Act, 1890 hut fortunately this journey has not to be suffered in the present case. This convoluted exercise could easily have been avoided if the Legislature had incorporated the definition directly into the said Act, rather than refer to the many that were obtaining in the sundry legislations then existing. Alternatively, the legislature need not have incorporated any definition into the said Act, thereby enabling a dynamic and contemporary interpretation and implementation of the said Act. More importantly, is it not open to the Court to consider the definition of industry contained in the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, enacted just a year later, or is it to be strait-jacketed to the archaic definition in the earlier statutes. This case also highlights the wisdom in the opinion expressed as far back as in 1865 in Wakefiled board of Health Vs. West Riding etc. ,. R v. (1805) 6 Bands 794 "i hope the time will come when we shall see no more of interpretation Clauses, for they frequently lead to confusion. " Similar views were again articulated by the House of Lords in Knightsbridge Trust Vs. Byrne (1940) 2 All ER 407.

( 3 ) THE relevant statutory provisions are reproduced hereafter for easy and ready reference. Section 2 (e) of the said Act states that;- "industrial establishment" means; (i) an industrial establishment as defined in clause (ii) of Section 2 of the Payment of Mages Act 1936, or (ii) a factory as defined in clause (m) of Section 2 of the factories Act, 1948, or (iii) a railway as defined in clause (4) of Section 2 of the Indian railways Act, 1890, or (iv) the establishment of a person who, for the purpose of fulfilling a contract with the owner of any industrial establishment, employs workmen. Industrial Establishments in clause (ii) of Section 2 of the payment of wages Act 1936 means -

" (A) tramway service, or motor transport service engaged in carrying passengers or goods or both by road, for hire or reward; (aa) air transport service other than such service belonging to, or exclusively employed in the military, naval or air forces of the Union or the Civil Avia