". . . HOWEVER, the petitioner/applicant is at liberty to make any representation to the authorities for getting the land released and it is for the authorities to examine whether in view of the modern sports complex having been brought into existence in the land in question could it serve the public purpose of acquiring this land for that particular scheme or the scheme is liable to be modified or amended in respect of the land in question. . . . "we have given serious consideration to the aforesaid submission. The much needed housing project, which is required for large number of applicants, is one of the considerations for the impugned decision. The decision making authority had given primacy and preference to the housing project over the sports dub. Such a consideration is implicit in the decision itself. It was not necessary to state the obvious. It is well settled that right to shelter is a fundamental right [see New Reviera Coop. Housing society and another v. Special Land Acquisition Officer and others, (1996) 1 Supreme court Cases 731]. In view of this position, preference given to the housing project over the sports club cannot be frowned upon as the State is fulfilling the basic human need of shelter. Re. Second Reason: it cannot be disputed that the first petitioner raised the construction over the land after the issuance of the notification under Section 4 of the Act, the publication of the declaration under Section 6 thereof, and the publication of the award of the Collector. In addition, the land is said to have been sold to Sh. Amrit Lal Khanna and others through a sale deed dated 31/01/1969, subsequent to the issuance of the notification and the declaration under Sections 4 and 6 of the Act respectively in violation of the provisions of the Delhi Lands (Restrictions on Transfer) Act, 1972. The construction, therefore, is unauthorised and has been raised at the peril of the petitioners. In this view we are supported by the decision of the Supreme Court in murari's case (supra), where it was observed as follows :-

". . . SO far as the structures and constructions made on the land are concerned there is no material to show that they were made before the issuance of notification under Section 4 of the Act. It is also not clear whether such constructions were raised with or without necessary sanction/approval of the competent authority. No grievance, therefore, can legitimately be raised in that behalf as the same would be regarded as unauthorised and made at the risk of the land owners. . . "despite the aforesaid observations of the Supreme Court the learned senior counsel for the petitioners submitted that under the Delhi Lands (Restrictions on transfer) Act, there is no embargo on the purchaser to buy the land after the same has been notified under the Land Acquisition Act. They also submitted that the Delhi lands (Restrictions on Transfer) Act does not prescribe any penalty or punishment for the purchaser who buys the land after the issuance of the declaration under Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act. It was also contended by them that the petitioners could not only buy the land after the publication of declaration under Section 6 of the act, but they could even built upon it. We cannot subscribe to the aforesaid view. Such a view is not only opposed to policy behind the Delhi Lands (Restrictions on Transfer) act but is also not in conformity with the provisions thereof. In Section 4 of the Delhi lands (Restrictions on Transfer) Act there is an explicit restriction on the seller to sell the land. This being so, surely it cannot be argued that there is no corresponding restriction on the purchaser to buy the same. Contention raised by the petitioners tends to defeat the purpose and object of the Delhi Lands (Restrictions on Transfer) act, 1972. The learned senior counsel for the petitioners relied upon the decisions of the supreme Court in Smt. Gunwant Kaur and others v. Municipal Committee, Bhatinda and other

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