SMUGGLING activities involving smuggling, abetment of smuggling and dealing with smuggled goods are necessary concomitants of each other and one cannot exist independently of another. "

"nearly or remotely, they are connected with each other and stating them in the order of detention joined with 'or' cannot given rise to the inference that I did not apply my mind to the facts.

IN any case, I reiterate that I fully applied my mind to the relevant material before issuing the order of detention. I am further advised to submit that the ratio of the judgments cited in this paragraph has no application to the facts of this case. "

IT is exactly this kind of explanation that was considered by the Supreme Court in Kishori Mohan Bera's case and rejected with the following observations:-

"if he felt the necessity to detain the petitioner from the activities described by him in the grounds of detention on the ground that those activities affected or were likely to affect both the public order and the security of the state he would, no doubt have used the conjunctive 'and' and not the disjunctive 'or' in his order. "

( 28 ) WE have, therefore, to hold that by the use of the disjunctive in the order of detention, the District Magistrate was not certain whether he was detaining the petitioner in order to prevent him from smuggling goods or from abetting other persons to smuggle goods or from dealing in smuggled goods, and that without applying his mind, he had merely mechanically reproduced the language of section 3 (1) (c) of the Act. This uncertainty and lack of application of mind cannot amount to the subjective satisfaction of the District Magistrate as is required under section 3 (1) (c) of the Act. The order of detention, therefore, has been passed by the District Magistrate without his Subjective satisfaction and as such. it is not an order in accordance with section 3 (1) (c) of the Act. The detention order is, therefore, an illegal order and is liable to be quashed on this ground.

( 29 ) THE petitioner has also challenged the validity of the order of detention on the ground that the grounds of detention are either vague or irrelevant or non-existent or showed bona fides on the part of the detaining authority. The learned counsel for the petitioner has contented firstly that the grounds of detention are not in strict conformity with the provisions of section 8 (1) of the Act and secondly, that as the order of detention is based upon such grounds, it is not an order based upon the subjective satisfaction of the District Magistrate and is, therefore, not a valid order under section 3 (l) (c), of the Act.

( 30 ) THE first contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is based upon section 8 (1) of the Act which reads-

"when a person is detained in pursuance of a detention order, the authority making the order shall, as soon as may be, but ordinarily not later than five days and in exceptional circumstances and for reasons to be recorded in writing, not later than fifteen days from the date of detention, communicate to him the grounds on which the order has been made and shall afford him the earliest opportunity of making a representation against the order to the appropriate Government. "

ACCORDING to the learned counsel, the grounds of detention should be of such a nature as would enable the petitioner to make an effective representation to the Government and that when the grounds are either vague or irrelevant or non-existent, he would be deprived of the opportunity of making an effective representation given to him under section 8 (1) of the Act. In support of this contention, the learned counsel seeks to invoke the principles enunciated by the Supreme Court on the scope of Article 22 (5) of the Constitution which is couched in language similar to the language in section 8 (1) of the Act. According to the learned counsel, the Presidential Order only precludes the petitioner from seeking the aid of Article 22 (5) of the Constitution,

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