The central legal point established in the judgment is the wide and expansive power conferred by Article 226 of the Constitution to reach injustice wherever it is found and enforce the law of the land, particularly in directing the return of complaints filed under Section 138 of NI Act in Courts without territorial jurisdiction.

1. Petitioner which is a Legal Aid Committee has filed the present writ petition in public interest under Article 226 of the Constitution of India praying for issuance of an appropriate writ, order or direction directing return of all criminal complaints filed under the provisions of Section 138 of Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (hereinafter referred to as "NI Act") that are pending in the Courts of the Metropolitan Magistrates in Delhi, in which cognizance has been taken, even though the Metropolitan Magistrates have no territorial jurisdiction to entertain and try them.

2. Ms. Iyoti Singh, learned Counsel for petitioner stated that a large number of cases have been filed by various financial institutions, banks and other complainants under Section 138 of NI Act in Courts of Metropolitan Magistrates in Delhi regarding dishonour of cheques, without first ascertaining whether the trial Courts in Delhi have territorial jurisdiction in the matter or not. According to Ms. Singh, in most of the cases, financial institutions/banks have filed complaints in Delhi only on the ground that the statutory notice of 15 days after dishonour of cheque had been issued from Delhi even though the same was communicated outside Delhi and further the cause of action also arose outside the territory of Delhi. She stated that in many cases, financial institutions/other complainants for their own convenience have filed complaints in Delhi even though the accused are staying in far off States like Kerala in South India.

3. Ms. Singh submitted that the Supreme Court in Harnam Electronics Pvt. Ltd. v. National Panasonic India Pvt. Ltd., reported in 156 (2009) DLT 160 (SC)=I (2009) BC 649 (SC)=I (2009) SLT 102=2009 (1) SCC 720, has held that mere issuance of a notice from Delhi will not confer territorial jurisdiction on the Courts in Delhi to entertain a complaint under Section 138 of NI Act, as it would by itself not give rise to a cause of action.

4. Ms Singh stated that following the aforesaid judgment, Metropolitan Magistrates of Delhi had dismissed many complaints where the Courts at Delhi did not have territorial jurisdiction. She further stated that the Metropolitan Magistrates suo motu also dismissed certain complaints where they had already issued summons earlier, though erroneously. She submitted that the financial institutions aggrieved by the said orders of Metropolitan Magistrates filed several criminal revisions before this Court.

5. Ms. Singh stated that a learned Single Judge of this Court decided a batch of matters vide common judgment dated 15th May, 2009 in the case [CICI Bank Ltd. v. Subhash Chand Bansal, reported in 160 (2009) DLT 379=III (2009) BC 430=III (2009) CCR 126=III (2009) CLT 166. In cases where learned Metropolitan Magistrates had dismissed the complaint at the very threshold and initial stage, without issuing notice, the learned Single Judge held that" I am in respect fill agreement with the above said ratio of the decision in the case of M/s. Hamam Electronics". After holding so the learned Single Judge upheld the order of trial Court returning the complaints on the ground of lack of territorial jurisdiction. In respect of cases, where learned Metropolitan Magistrates had suo motu dismissed complaints and in cases where summons had already been issued, the learned Single Judge while relying upon Adalat Prashad Rooplal v. Jindal and Ors., reported in 113 (2004) DL T 356 (SC)=III (2004) CCR 176 (SC)=V (2004) SL T 353=2004 (7) SCC 338, held "after taking cognizance of the offence under Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 it is not open to them to suo motu throw out the criminal complaints abruptly by declaring that they do not have territorial jurisdiction to deal with the, matter. Adoption of such a course is strictly prohibited by the Apex Court in the case of Adalat Prashad".

6. According to Ms. Singh, the effect of the said judgment is that the Metropolitan Magistrates are not able to Suo motu dismiss/return the complai