Vikramajit Sen, J.

1. The feature at the fulcrum of the friction before us pertains to the parameters within which the Writ Court can provide its protection to the Petitioners at the pre-execution stage of preventive detention orders passed against them. The law on this subject was crystalized and enunciated in the decision of a Three-Judge Bench of Supreme Court in Addl. Secy. to the Govt. of India v. Alka Subhash Gadia 1991 (53) ELT 481(SC) which has been followed in almost all subsequent cases. The only exception that we have come across is Union of India v. Parasmal Rampuria (1998) 8 SCC 402 in which their Lordships held that the Petitioner must surrender before he can be heard in his challenge to the legality of the Detention Order; significantly, Gadia was not cited before their Lordships. In Sayed Taher Bawamiya v. Joint Secretary to the Govt. of India 2002 CriLJ 259 , which is a Three-Judge Bench decision, the five Gadia exceptions had been reiterated, namely, that courts would be empowered to interfere with detention orders at the pre-execution stage only if they are prima facie satisfied - (i) that the impugned order is not passed under the Act under which it is purported to have been passed, (ii) that it is sought to be executed against a wrong person, (iii) that it is passed for a wrong purpose, (iv) that it is passed on vague, extraneous and irrelevant grounds, or (v) that the authority which passed it had no authority to do so. Their Lordships categorically rejected the argument that these five exceptions are not exhaustive. Both these cases were taken note of in Union of India v. Amrit Lal Manchanda 2004 CriLJ 1426 which is one of the decisions to which our attention has been drawn by Ms. Babbar, learned Counsel for the Respondents.

2. Similar observations can be found in Union of India v. Vidya Bagaria 2004 CriLJ 2480 and Union of India v. Chaya Ghoshal 2005 (98) ECC 1 in which their Lordships inter alias observed as follows:

9. The constitutional philosophy of personal liberty is an idealistic view, the curtailment of liberty for reasons of States security, public order, disruption of national economic discipline, etc. being envisaged as a necessary evil to be administered under strict constitutional restrictions. In Icchu Devi Choraria v. Union of India [1981] 1 SCR 640 this judicial commitment was highlighted in the following words:

The Court has always regarded personal liberty as the most precious possession of mankind and refused to tolerate illegal detention, regardless of the social cost involved in the release of a possible renegade.

This is an area where the Court has been most strict and scrupulous in ensuring observance with the requirements of the law, and even where a requirement of the law is breached in the slightest measure, the Court has not hesitated to strike down the order of detention-

13. So far as the pivotal question whether there was delay in disposal of the representation is concerned, same has to be considered in the background of Article 22(5) of the Constitution. A constitutional protection is given to every detenu which mandates the grant of liberty to the detenu to make a representation against detention, as imperated in Article 22(5) of the Constitution. It also imperates the authority to whom the representation is addressed to deal with the same with utmost expedition. The representation is to be considered in its right perspective keeping in view the fact that the detention of the detenu is based on subjective satisfaction of the authority concerned, and infringement of the constitutional right conferred under Article 22(5) invalidates the detention order. Personal liberty protected under Article 21 is so sacrosanct and so high in the scale of constitutional values that it is the obligation of the detaining authority to show that the impugned detention meticulously accords with the procedure established by law. The stringency and concern of the judicial vigilance tha