The main legal point established in the judgment is the importance of strict compliance with procedural requirements of the statute, especially concerning the time period for service of an Award.

Vikramajit Sen, J.

1. This Appeal assails the Order of the Learned Single Judge passed on August 28, 2009 holding that the signed copy of the Award had been delivered to the Petitioner on 13th May, 2009, as required by Section 31(5) and Section 34(3) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (hereinafter referred to as the "A & C Act"). It had further been held that inasmuch as the Petition under Section 34 of the "A & C Act" had been filed on 3.2.2005, it was barred by time and hence liable to be dismissed. It is not in the pail of controversy that the Award had been made available to the counsel for the Appellant, and had not been directly served on the Appellant.

2. A detailed discussion is not called for since the matter is covered on all fours by a Judgment of a Division Bench of this Court titled National Projects Constructions Corporation Limited v. Bundela Bandhu Constructions Co. AIR 2007 Delhi 202 : 139 (2007) DLT 676. No further controversy remains in view of the pronouncement in Union of India v. Tecco Trechy Engineers and Contractors (2005) 4 SCC 239, which has been duly considered and applied in Bundela Bandhu. Both these cases have been cited by the Appellant before the Learned Single Judge, who has articulated the view that the ratio cannot be made applicable to Private Limited Companies. In Bundela Bandhu, the Division Bench had kept in prospective similar provisions as contained in Order XXXVII of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 and Section 25B of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958. Noting those Provisions especially concerning the time period, it had been held that service of an Award should be made on the concerned party. To this, we may add the pronouncement which have withstood almost one century of scrutiny namely Nazir Ahmed v. King Emperor AIR 1936 PL 253, which is to the effect that if an action has to be taken in a particular manner it must be in that manner only, else will be held not to have been done at all. Wisdom of this pronouncement is manifestly clear in the facts presented in the present case. The same abiding reasoning in respect of strict compliance with procedural requirement of a statute warranting strict interpretation is applied by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Ramchandra Keshav Adke v. Govind Joti Chavre (1975) 1 SCC 915; Shiv Bahadur Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh AIR 1954 SC 322 and Deep Chand v. State of Rajasthan AIR 1961 SC 1527. So much judicial time has been wasted in entertaining arguments which would have been unnecessary, had the Award been served on the party concerned, namely, the Appellant. In view of Section 2(h) of the "A & C Act", there is no justifiable reason to depart from succinct and precise definition of the word "party", which means a party to an arbitration agreement. Facially, these words cannot take within their sweep an "agent" of the party which is incompetent to take the requisite action envisaged under the statute. Learned Counsel for the Respondent has drawn our attention to Nilkantha Sidramappa Ningashetti v. Kashinath Somanna Ningashetti AIR 1962 SC 666, which dealt with Section 14(2) of the Arbitration Act, 1940. The reasoning and views contained therein cannot be extrapolated to the "A & C Act" inasmuch as the condonation of delay in filing the Objections filed under the earlier and repealed Act could be prayed for before the Court on an open end basis instead of a precise period of 30 days prescribed under the "A & C Act". For the same reason, East India Hotels Ltd. v. Agra Development Authority (2001) 4 SCC 175 and Secretary to Govt. of Karnataka v. V. Harishbabu (1996) 5 SCC 400 are of no assistance in the present case. We are unable to appreciate the manner in which Amit Malik v. Kamlesh Malik 129 (2006) DLT 510, can advance the case of the Respondent. The Division Bench had declined to accept the hypotechnical objection namely that the copy of the Award actually served on the Objector was not of the Award which was registered. We are i