The judgment established the applicability of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 to protect a probationer's rights and emphasized the mandatory nature of the provision, rendering a termination without compliance null and void.

Vipin Sanghi, J.

1. The petitioner management by this writ petition has assailed the industrial award dated 11.09.2006 made by the Central Government Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court-II (hereinafter referred to as CGIT), Rajendra Bhawan, Rajendra Place, New Delhi in I.D. No.37/2003 arising out of the industrial disputes raised by the respondent workman, which were referred by the Appropriate Government for adjudication. The terms of reference read as follows:

“1. Whether the demand of the union in relation to equal wages for equal work as performed by Shri Ramesh Chander for performing the work at par with the permanent employees for the period w.e.f. 01.04.1986 to 30.09.1988 as Peon and w.e.f. 01.10.1988 to 01.09.1996 is just, fair and legal? If yes, what relief he is entitled to and from what date.

2. Whether the action of the management of Council for Advancement of Pupil’s Action and Rural Technology, New Delhi in terminating the services of Shri Ramesh Chander, Ex. Clerk w.e.f 21.08.1998 during probation period for not obeying the lawful order of competent authority, without holding domestic inquiry is just, fair and legal? If not, what relief the workman is entitled to and from what date.”

2. The CGIT by the impugned award answered the points of reference in favour of the respondent workman. In the claim statement filed by the respondent, he stated that he was initially employed as a Peon on daily wages w.e.f. 01.04.1986 and worked in that capacity up to 30.09.1988. Thereafter he was again appointed to the post of L.D.C. on daily wages w.e.f. 01.10.1988. The petitioner was issued the appointment letter dated 20.06.1996 appointing him to the post of L.D.C. and his services were regularized as L.D.C. w.e.f. 02.09.1996 in the pay scale of Rs.950-20-1150-EB-25-1500. This letter of appointment stated that the appointment was offered against a post sanctioned for the North Zone Regional Committee, Jaipur of the petitioner Council for Advancement of People’s Action and Rural Technology (CAPART). The appointment memorandum contained, inter alia, the following clause:

“2. The appointment is subject to the following conditions:-

(i) The appointee will be on probation for a period of two years which will be extended at the discretion of the competent authority. If no orders are passed by the competent authority on expiry of the said period of two years, the period of probation shall be deemed to have been extended till such time as specific orders are passed in this regard. During the probation, he will be required to undergo such training etc. as may be considered necessary, as part of duty. The appointing authority, however, reserves the right of terminating the service of the appointee forthwith or before the expiry of notice period by making payment to the appointee a sum equivalent to the pay and allowances for the period of notice or the unexpired portion thereof.”

3. The respondent claimed that the appointment to the post of L.D.C. was of regular nature.

4. The respondent further submitted that he was directed to put up two files mentioned in the communication dated 07.01.1998 issued by the petitioner management, failing which he was threatened that he would be suspended and disciplinary action would be initiated against him. He further claimed that without issuing any charge-sheet or conducting any inquiry, vide order dated 14.08.1998, his services were terminated with effect from 21.08.1998. The respondent claimed the order of termination to be a camouflage. It was claimed that the termination was, in fact, penal though on the face of it, the same appeared to be innocuous. He further claimed that one Sh. Rajender Kumar, Research Assistant, who was also terminated at the same time, was eventually taken back into service as his termination was set aside in a departmental appeal. But the respondent was denied similar treatment. The respondent, therefore, alleged discriminatory treatment at the hands of the p