Point of Law: In the Delhi Rent Control Act 1958, the definition of 'a tenant' is contained in Clause (I) of Section 2. Tenant includes 'any person continuing in possession after the termination of his tenancy' and does not include 'any person against whom an order or decree for eviction has been made'.

JUDGMENT :

V. Kameswar Rao, J.

1. The challenge in this appeal is to a Judgment/Decree dated January 25, 2020, passed by the Addl. District Judge-07, (South-East), Saket Courts, New Delhi in Amarjit Singh and Anr. vs. Vinod Bhatnagar and Ors., Civil Suit No. 208785/2016, whereby the Trial Court has decreed the suit in favour of the respondent Nos. 1 and 2/plaintiffs against all the defendants i.e., (appellants and respondent No. 3) for a sum of Rs. 18,00,000/- with simple interest @ 6% per annum from the date of filing of the suit till realization along with the cost of the suit.

2. The facts as noted from the record are that respondent No. 3/Vinod Bhatnagar (defendant No. 1 in the suit) had occupied a shop on the ground floor of the back portion of the property bearing No. HS-2, Kailash Colony Market, New Delhi, and one miani/mezzanine in property bearing No. HS-2/1, Kailash Colony Market, New Delhi at a monthly rent of Rs. 350/- excluding all other charges.

3. Respondent No. 3/Vinod Bhatnagar (defendant No. 1 in the suit) sublet the possession of the aforesaid tenanted portion to the appellant No. 1/Trilochan Singh (defendant No. 2 in the suit) and Sh. Harbans Lal.

4. Two petitions under Section 14(1)(a) and under Section 14 (1)(b) of the Delhi Rent Control Act (‘DRC’, for short) were filed against respondent No. 3, appellant No. 1, and Sh. Harbans Lal.

5. An eviction order was passed on April 19, 2003, in favour of the respondent Nos. 1 and 2/plaintiffs and Sh. Surjit Singh and against respondent No. 3/(defendant No. 1 in the suit), appellant No. 1/(defendant No. 2 in the suit), and Sh. Harbans Lal. Thereafter, appeals were filed by respondent No. 3/Vinod Bhatnagar (defendant No. 1), appellant No. 1/Trilochan Singh(defendant No. 2), and Sh. Harbans Lal, which were dismissed on November 22, 2006. Thereafter, they preferred CM(M) Nos. 65/2007 and 70/2007 before this Court.

6. Sh. Harbans Lal died during the pendency of the proceedings and the appellant Nos. 2 to 4 who were defendant Nos. 3 to 5 being the only legal heirs of Sh. Harbans Lal were substituted in those proceedings. Both the CM(M) Nos. 67/2007 and 70/2007 were dismissed vide order dated January 03, 2012. Sh. Surjit Singh relinquished his share in the property by virtue of relinquishment deed/release deed for consideration dated February 15, 2006, in favour of respondent Nos. 1 and 2 and he was left with no right/title or interest in the suit property.

7. Respondent No. 3/Vinod Bhatnagar (defendant No. 1 in the suit) and the appellants (defendant Nos. 2 to 5 in the suit) failed to vacate the suit property/premises after passing of the eviction order dated April 19, 2003, and continued in possession.

8. It is the case of the respondent Nos. 1 and 2/plaintiffs that they being unauthorized occupants are liable to pay the damages for use/occupation/mesne profits @ Rs. 50,000/- per month for three years prior to the filing of the suit.

9. Written statement was filed by the appellants herein. Defendant No. 1 (respondent No. 3 herein) did not file any written statement. The case of the appellants (defendants in the suit) is that respondent Nos. 1 and 2/plaintiffs are guilty of suppression of material facts. It is stated that the appellants had approached the Supreme Court against the order/Judgment dated January 03, 2012, passed by this Court and the Supreme Court vide order dated May 08, 2012, passed the following order :

“Delay in filing substitution application is condoned and the application for substitution, to bring on record the legal representatives of deceased petitioner No. 2 Harbans Lal Aneja, is allowed. Permission to file SLP by these legal representative is granted. After having heard learned counsel for the petitioners and after having gone through the impugned order and the record, we find no ground to interfere with it and the special leave petitions are dismissed.

However, looking to the facts and features of the case we deem it fit and proper to grant one year’s ti