The main legal point established in the judgment is the need for a liberal construction of 'sufficient cause' and a pragmatic approach to advance substantial justice in applications for condonation of delay and restoration of appeal.

ORDER

Jyoti Singh, J. (Oral). - Present petition has been filed assailing the order dated 19.11.2020 whereby the applications filed by the Petitioner for restoration of the appeal and condonation of delay in filing the restoration application have been dismissed.

2. Petitioner is a partnership firm with two partners. An Assessment Order was passed by Assistant Provident Fund Commissioner, Faridabad under Section 7(A) of the Employees Provident Fund & Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952 (hereinafter referred to as the 'the Act') on 29.11.2012 assessing Rs.6,55,380/- allegedly payable by the Petitioner establishment. The said order was challenged by the Petitioner by an appeal before the Employees Provident Fund Appellate Tribunal (now Central Government Industrial Tribunal), Delhi, in the year 2013, being ATA No. 184(16) 2013. Appeal was admitted on 19.03.2013, subject to deposit of 25% of the assessed amount.

3. The appeal was dismissed in default on 10.05.2016 due to non-appearance of the Petitioner, but was restored on 06.06.2016. Yet again, when the appeal was listed on 14.12.2016, there was no appearance on behalf of the Petitioner and the CGIT dismissed the appeal in default. After a lapse of nearly 3 years, Petitioner filed an application for restoration of the appeal along with an application for condonation of delay. However, the CGIT vide order dated 19.11.2020 dismissed both the applications on the ground that several adjournments had been allowed to the Petitioner for hearing and even on earlier occasion i.e. on 10.05.2016, the appeal was dismissed in default, indicating lack of diligence on the part of the Petitioner in the conduct of the appeal. CGIT was of the view that the explanation for non-appearance and condonation of delay mentioned in the applications, was not convincing to the conscience of the Tribunal.

4. Order dated 19.11.2020 is assailed before this Court by the Petitioner in the present writ petition. Be it noted that during the pendency of the writ petition, Petitioner was permitted to file an additional affidavit explaining the sequence of the proceedings before the CGIT from 2013 and reasons for non-appearance on the date when the appeal was dismissed in default as well as for condonation of delay in filing the restoration application. Detailed affidavit was filed by the Petitioner on 23.03.2021 and a response thereto was filed by the Respondents.

5. In the additional affidavit filed in this Court, it is sought to be explained by the Petitioner that the order dated 14.12.2016 was never communicated to the Petitioner and the Petitioner was under a bonafide impression that the appeal was pending before the CGIT. The said order came to the knowledge of the Petitioner only when coercive action was initiated by the Respondents.

6. On coming to know of the order dated 14.12.2016, an application was filed by the Petitioner for inspection of the file before the CGIT and file was inspected on 24.10.2019. After perusing the exact order, an application for restoration of the appeal was filed on 30.10.2019, which was dismissed by the CGIT.

7. The reasons set out in the application for restoration were that the counsel who was appearing on the previous dates, left the office of the main counsel, without intimating the status of the proceedings or the date of hearing, on which date, the appeal was dismissed. Order dated 14.12.2016 was never communicated to the Petitioner by the office of the CGIT or the Respondents. Non-appearance was on account of reasons beyond the control of the Petitioner and bonafide. Petitioner should not be penalized due to the non-appearance of a counsel. In the application seeking condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, it was averred that the Petitioner was unaware of the order dated 14.12.2016 dismissing the appeal in default as the same was never served on or communicated to the Petitioner. On coming to know of the order, when coercive action was initiated by the R