Condonation of delay should be allowed if sufficient cause is shown, and the words 'sufficient cause' should be understood and applied in a reasonable, pragmatic, practical, and liberal manner.

JUDGMENT

Sanjeev Narula, J. - I.A. 3203/2020 (for exemption)

1. Allowed, subject to all just exceptions.

2. The application is disposed of.

I.A. 3205/2020 (for delay in re-filing on behalf of the Petitioner) & I.A.9421/2020 (delay in filing of petition on behalf of the Petitioner)

3. By way of the present applications, the Petitioner has sought condonation of 2 days delay in re-filing the petition and 28 days in filing the petition. The factual background is necessary to be noted for deciding the present applications. The award impugned is dated 2nd November, 2019. The date of the receipt of the award is not in dispute as the Petitioner confirms the date of award to be the date of receipt. The petition before this Court came to be filed first on 28th January, 2020. It was re-filed on 27th February, 2020, and then again on 29th February, 2020 and finally on 2nd March, 2020. On 2nd March, 2020, the petition as filed was accompanied by an application being I.A 3205/2020 seeking condonation of delay in re-filing. Later, another application [I.A. 9421/2020] was filed seeking condonation of delay in filing of the petition. These two applications are under consideration.

4. Mr. Rajiv Bansal, learned Senior Counsel for the Petitioner submits that the petition was filed within the period of limitation and was a proper filling. Further, without prejudice to Petitioner s rights and contentions, Mr. Bansal submits that the filing before this Court as on 27th February, 2020, and certainly the one re-filed on 29th February, 2020 was complete in all respects and all the defects had been removed. He submits that if for any reason the first filing on 28th January, 2020 is considered to be deficient or non est, then the re-filed petition as on 27th February, 2020, being entirely in compliance with the rules, was within the prescribed period of 30 days under Section 34(3) of the Act. Since the Petitioner was prevented by sufficient cause from making the application within the prescribed time, the Court may condone the delay and entertain the petition.

5. Mr. Bhupesh Narula, learned counsel for the Respondent vociferously opposes the prayer made in the application. Mr. Narula submits that there is a complete abuse of process of law at the hands of the Petitioner. He submits the petition, in its original form is a non-est filing, and the same is evident from a perusal of the objection sheet/defect sheet issued by the Registry. It had several deficiencies that were non-curable, as it did not contain the name of the person filing on behalf of the Petitioner; signature of Petitioner; not accompanied with a vakalatnama etc. amongst several other defects. The petition that was re-filed is not the same. It is an entirely a different petition in comparison to the one filed on 28th January, 2020. The grounds urged in the original petition have been entirely transformed. If the Petitioner had to amend the grounds, an appropriate application for amendment ought to have been filed and amendments should have carried out with the leave of the Court. The Petitioner cannot in the process of re-filing, alter the grounds and file a completely different petition. He further submits that the petition filed on 28th January/29th January, 2020, should have been listed before the Court in accordance with the Delhi High Court Rules for the purpose of rejecting the same but the same was not done. Instead, under the same filing number the amended petition was re-filed on 27th February, 2020. Mr. Narula further submits that the Petitioner has not been able to show sufficient cause for seeking condonation of delay. He submits that the reasons stated in I.A. 3205/2020 are entirely different from what has been stated I.A. 9421/2020. In the first application seeking condonation of delay, it has been stated that the record was voluminous and the process of removing defects took some time and the concerned associate of the counsel for the Petitioner had left the office. In the second