Vikramajit Sen, J.

1. This Appeal assails the Order dated 5.9.2007 wherein the learned Single Judge has taken the view that the filing of the Objections under Section 34 of the A&C Act in the Court of the District Judge, Delhi was not carried out in good faith; and that the refiling in the Court possessing jurisdiction, that is, the High Court of Delhi was carried out after 45 days of its return disclosed lack of diligence. The learned Single Judge held that even assuming that the period of one year and seven months could be excluded for filing (refiling) while computing the period of limitation, by availing Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963, the Objections were nevertheless time barred.

2. The facts of the case are that the subject arbitral Award was published on 10.11.2004 and was received by the Appellant on 17.11.2004. The period of three months set-down in Section 34(3) of the A&C Act commenced running from 17.11.2004 and in its ordinary course culminated on 15.2.2005. The Objections were filed in the Court of District Judge, Delhi on 25.1.2005, that is, leaving unutilized/unavailed twenty two days in the permissible period. The Respondent filed an application in the Court of the Additional District Judge, Delhi to whom the lis was assigned, predicated on Section 42 of the A&C Act, praying that the Objections should not be entertained as Court of District Judge did not possess jurisdiction for their adjudication. Indubitably, since the appointment of the Arbitrator had been made by this Court, "all subsequent applications arising out of that agreement and the arbitral proceedings" would have to be filed in the High Court of Delhi. The Appellant did not contest this position and asked for the withdrawal of the Objections on 14.8.2006. It has been clarified that the Objections were filed in the Court of District Judge because the Award had granted ` 5,37,160/- and the pecuniary jurisdiction of the High Court of Delhi is from ` 20,00,001/- and upwards. It is also not in dispute that the Objections alongwith the entire records were returned by the Additional District Judge, Delhi to the Appellant on 25.8.2006 and were filed/refiled in this High Court on 10.10.2006. Mr. G.K. Sharma, learned counsel for the Respondent, however, submits that when the filing/refiling was carried out by the Petitioner in this Court on 10.10.2006, the Objections already stood time barred.

3. We had occasion to consider this interesting question of law in Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited v. Haryana Telecom Limited, 2010 VII AD (Delhi) 331 : 2010 (116) DRJ 597. We think it necessary to reproduce the relevant paragraphs of the said Judgment:

11. We have expressed the opinion, hereinabove, that since the Arbitral Award was not delivered by the Arbitral Tribunal [as envisaged in Section 31(5) of the A&C Act] to the party, the period for filing of Objections must be held not to have commenced. Would this view remain steadfast even in circumstances where Objections have actually been filed by the concerned party albeit in the wrong Court. This is the legal nodus which remains to be answered. It is axiomatic jurisprudence that there is no estoppel against the statute. In this case, however, this principle would not apply for the reason that the party concerned, upon having filed Objections, has exercised a right vested and bestowed upon it by virtue of a statute. Moreover, law unhesitatingly and unquestionably acts on admissions made by a litigating party. In this case the Appellant has itself stated that copies of the Award were received by it (from the Respondent/Decree Holder) on 6.11.2000, and thus, we find good reason to take this date as the commencement of the period of limitation. On principles analogous to Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963, the period expended in a Court not possessing jurisdiction would have to be excluded. Exclusion of time is an exercise totally distinct from condoning the delay in filing an action. On the rejection or return