The central legal point established in the judgment is the necessity of specific allegations in the complaint reflecting the role of the accused to establish vicarious liability under Section 141 of the N.I. Act.

JUDGMENT

1. The petitions are disposed of through this common order as they are between the same parties and in respect of connected complaint cases filed under Section 138 read with Section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881(for short 'N.I. Act') for dishonor of cheques issued in respect of the same transaction.

2. The respondents had filed the complaints under Section 138 read with Section 141 of the N.I. Act against Pantel Technologies Pvt. Limited and its directors, the present petitioners Javahar Lal and Vivek Prakash. The learned Trial Court after considering the material on the record, took cognizance of the complaint and issued summons. The present petitions have been filed praying that the proceedings pending before the learned MM be quashed qua the petitioner arrayed as accused No.2 in the complaints.

3. Mr. A.P. Mohanty, learned counsel for the petitioner has argued relying on the judgment of the Supreme Court in Ramrajsingh vs. State of Madhya Pradesh (2009) 6 SCC 729 that the complaints qua the petitioner had to be quashed since the complaints contained no averment to the effect that the petitioner was in-charge of and responsible to the company for the conduct of its business. It was submitted that in the absence of such averments, the petitioner could not be made vicariously liable for the commission of the offence by the company which has been arrayed in the complaints as accused No.1. The prosecution could be commenced only if there were specific allegations in the complaints as to the part played by the petitioner. However, there were no such allegations in the complaints. The learned counsel has prayed that the petition be allowed, and the complaint quashed as prayed for.

4. The respondents have filed a reply asserting that the petitioner was a Director of the accused company and execution of the MoU and Tripartite Agreements and other business decisions including the issuance of the cheques could have taken place only with the consent, permission and instructions and knowledge of the directors being the petitioner and the accused No.3 in the complaint cases. Mr. Vivek Sarin, learned counsel for the respondent No.1 submitted that more importantly the liability in respect of which the cheques in question have been issued arose out of the Tripartite Agreements which were signed by the petitioner. Therefore, the issuance of post-dated cheques in favour of the respondents for a sum of Rs. 23,57,43,675/- could not have been without the active consent of the petitioner. It was also submitted that the DIR-12 reflects that the petitioner was a director of the accused company. Therefore, he cannot claim to have had no role to play. The judgment of the Supreme Court in A.R. Radha Krishna vs. Dasari Deepthi (2019) 15 SCC 550 and of a Co-ordinate Bench of this Court in Unique Infoways Private Limited and Others vs. MPS Telecom Private Limited 2019 SCC OnLine Del 7808 have been relied upon by the learned counsel. It has also been asserted that the complaint refers to the role of the directors being the accused No.2 and 3 in the commission of the offence and there was no merit in the submissions of the petitioner.

5. I have heard the submissions of the learned counsel and considered the record and the cited judgments. It is trite that without specific allegations in the complaint reflecting the role of the accused, the persons named cannot be summoned in case under Section 138 read with 141 N.I. Act. As has been held in Ramrajsingh(supra) it is necessary to specifically aver in a complaint under Section 141 that at the time the offence was committed the person accused was in charge of and was responsible for the conduct of the business. This averment is an essential requirement of Section 141 and has to be made in the complaint without which the requirements of Section 141 cannot be held to be satisfied. CRL.M.C. Being a Director of a company would not suffice to make the person liable under Section 141 N.I. Act. A Di