2022 Supreme(Del) 1331

IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
Subramonium Prasad, J.
Anoop Singh Karayat - Appellant
Versus
State - Respondent
Crl.M.C. 3517 of 2021
Decided On : 16-02-2022

Headnote:

CRIMINAL - SECTION 389(2) CR.P.C. - SUSPENSION OF SENTENCE - CONSPIRACY - SECTION 10 OF THE INDIAN EVIDENCE ACT, 1872 - SCOPE AND APPLICABILITY - PARAMETERS FOR GRANT OF BAIL AND SUSPENSION OF SENTENCE - DISTINCTION - COURT'S DISCRETION TO SUSPEND SENTENCE DURING PENDENCY OF APPEAL - FACTORS TO BE CONSIDERED - CASE RELATING TO TAMPERING OF JUDICIAL RECORD - URGENCY IN DISPOSAL OF SUCH CASES - DUTY OF COURT TO ENSURE FAITH OF PUBLIC IN JUDICIARY IS NOT ERODED.

Fact of the Case:

Petitioner, convicted and sentenced to seven years' simple imprisonment for conspiracy and tampering with judicial records in the Uphaar Cinema fire case, challenged the order rejecting his application for suspension of sentence during the pendency of appeal. The conspiracy involved providing employment to a former court Ahlmad, who was dismissed for tampering with documents, to cover up the conspiracy to tamper with evidence in the main Uphaar case. The Petitioner argued that the conspiracy ended when the tampering was discovered, and his act of providing employment to the Ahlmad could not be considered part of the conspiracy. The State opposed the petition, contending that the Petitioner was part of a larger conspiracy to delay the trial and secure acquittal of the accused in the main case.

Finding of the Court:

The Court held that the question of whether the Petitioner knew about the conspiracy and whether providing employment to the Ahlmad was part of the conspiracy were matters to be decided by the Appellate Court during the appeal. The Court also clarified that the parameters for grant of bail under Section 439 Cr.P.C. and suspension of sentence under Section 389 Cr.P.C. are different, as the presumption of innocence is no longer applicable post-conviction. Considering the Petitioner's age, lack of previous antecedents, and the fact that he was not arrested during the trial, the Court suspended the sentence subject to furnishing a personal bond and sureties, and directed the Trial Court to expedite the hearing and disposal of the appeal within one month.

Issues: 1. Whether the Petitioner's act of providing employment to the former court Ahlmad, after he was dismissed for tampering with documents, could be considered part of the conspiracy to tamper with evidence in the main Uphaar case, beyond the period when the conspiracy was frustrated? 2. Whether the parameters for grant of bail under Section 439 Cr.P.C. and suspension of sentence under Section 389 Cr.P.C. are the same?

Ratio Decidendi: 1. The Court held that the question of whether the Petitioner knew about the conspiracy and whether providing employment to the Ahlmad was part of the conspiracy were matters to be decided by the Appellate Court during the appeal. The Court clarified that the evidentiary value of acts done in furtherance of a conspiracy is limited by two circumstances: (i) the acts shall be in reference to their common intention, and (ii) in respect of a period after such intention was entertained by any one of them. Once the conspiracy is frustrated, Section 10 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, which deals with the admissibility of statements and acts of co-conspirators, is not available and cannot be used to impute liability to co-conspirators for acts done beyond the period of the conspiracy. 2. The Court held that the parameters for grant of bail under Section 439 Cr.P.C. and suspension of sentence under Section 389 Cr.P.C. are different. While considering an application for bail under Section 439 Cr.P.C., there may be a presumption of innocence, and the Courts may be liberal in granting bail, depending on the facts and circumstances of the case. However, in case of post-conviction bail by way of suspension of operation of the sentence, there is a finding of guilt and the question of presumption of innocence does not arise. The Courts, while considering an application for suspension of sentence, have to consider the prima facie merits of the Appeal, coupled with other factors. There should be strong compelling reasons for grant of bail, notwithstanding an order of conviction, by suspension of sentence, and this strong and compelling reason must be recorded in the Order granting bail, as mandated in Section 389(1) Cr.P.C.

Final Decision: The Court suspended the Petitioner's sentence during the pendency of the appeal, subject to furnishing a personal bond and sureties, and directed the Trial Court to expedite the hearing and disposal of the appeal within one month.