IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
Navin Chawla, J.
Barasat Krishnagar Expressways Ltd - Petitioner
Versus
National Highways Authority Of India - Respondent
O.M.P.(MISC.)(COMM.) 198 OF 2022
Decided On : 18-01-2023
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 - Section 29A, (3), (6) - Arbitration Rules of Society for Affordable Redressal of Disputes-Ports - Rule 37.2 - Arbitrator - Seeking extension of time to pronounce Award - Petition filed seeking extension of time for learned Arbitral Tribunal to pronounce its Award – Held, Learned counsel for respondent is correct in his submission that an inordinate delay in passing of an Award is detrimental to very object of arbitration, however, in Court view, effect of delay in making an Award is to be considered by Court once Award is pronounced by Arbitral Tribunal and is challenged by either of parties in accordance with law –Court is of opinion that delay in pronouncing Award itself does not warrant exercise of powers vested in this Court under Section 29A (6) of Act - In view of above, Court is of opinion that time for making of Award by Arbitral Tribunal should be extended by a further period of two months from today - Petition allowed.
JUDGMENT :
Navin Chawla, J.
1. This petition has been filed under Section 29A of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Act’) seeking extension of time for the learned Arbitral Tribunal to pronounce its Award.
2. As disputes arose between the parties, the petitioner invoked the Arbitration Agreement between the parties in March 2016. The parties on 02.05.2016 entered into a Supplementary Agreement providing for the arbitration to be conducted through ‘Arbitration Rules of the Society for Affordable Redressal of Disputes-Ports (SAROD-Ports)’ (hereinafter referred to as the ‘SAROD Rules’). The learned Arbitral Tribunal was constituted on 02.06.2016. On expiry of the period of one year, the parties agreed to grant six months’ further extension in terms of Section 29A (3) of the Act to the learned Arbitral Tribunal to pronounce its Award. The petitioner thereafter filed an application under Section 29A of the Act before this Court.
3. In meantime, the Presiding Arbitrator of the learned Arbitral Tribunal was also substituted on 13.09.2018. Subsequently, the nominee arbitrator of the petitioner tendered his resignation and, therefore, had to be substituted.
4. On a petition filed under Section 29A of the Act, the time for making of the Arbitral Award was extended by a period of six months with effect from 18.03.2021. The learned Arbitral Tribunal concluded hearing the submissions of the parties on 25.09.2021. The learned Arbitral Tribunal directed the parties to file their written submissions, which were filed only on 09.01.2022. The parties further filed their respective cost submissions on 10.03.2022.
5. By an e-mail dated 21.11.2022, addressed to the parties, the learned Arbitral Tribunal, through the Presiding Arbitrator, requested the parties to obtain an extension of around two to three months for passing of the Arbitral Award.
6. The petitioner filed the present petition before this Court on or about 24.11.2022.
7. After notice on the present application had been issued to the respondent, the learned Arbitral Tribunal, through the Presiding Arbitrator, has informed the parties vide e-mail dated 19.12.2022 that the preparation of the Arbitral Award is at an advance stage and can be pronounced within a couple of weeks of the extension being granted by this Court.
8. The learned counsel for the respondent, however, opposes this application and submits that the present case requires the learned Arbitral Tribunal to be substituted in terms of Section 29A (6) of the Act. Drawing reference to Rule 37.2 of the SAROD Rules, he submits that the said rules mandate the Arbitral Award to be pronounced within 30 days from the date on which the hearing is closed and such time can be extended only by the Secretary of the SAROD or with the consent of the parties. He, however, fairly admits that the said provision cannot derogate from the power that is vested in this Court under Section 29A of the Act. He submits, the above default of the Arbitral Tribunal would still be a sufficient reason for this Court to exercise its powers under Section 29A(6) of the Act to substitute the Arbitral Tribunal.
9. Placing reliance on the judgment of the Supreme Court in Anil Rai v. State of Bihar, (2001) 7 SCC 318, he submits that the Supreme Court, albeit in relation to the pronouncement of the judgments by the Court, has framed guidelines prescribing time for pronouncement of the judgment. In terms of the guidelines, in case the judgment is not pronounced within a period of six months, either party may approach the Chief Justice of the High Court with a prayer to withdraw the said case and to make it over to any other Bench for fresh arguments. He submits that applying a similar principle, this Court should, in fact, substitute the Arbitrators as the Award has admittedly not been pronounced within a period of six months even from the date of submission of the written submissions.
10. The learned counsel for the respondent, placing
The main legal point established in the judgment is the court's authority to grant an extension of time for the conclusion of arbitration proceedings under Section 29-A(5) of the Arbitration and Conc....
The main legal point established in the judgment is that the court has the discretion to grant an extension of time for passing the arbitral award under the provisions of Section 29-A of the Arbitrat....
The main legal point established in the judgment is the court's discretion to grant an extension of time for the learned Arbitrator to conclude the arbitration proceedings, taking into account except....
(1) Extension of mandate of Arbitrator(s) – Application under Section 29A(5) for extension of mandate of Arbitrator is maintainable even after expiry of time under Sections 29A(1) and (3) and even af....
Jurisdiction under Section 29A of the Arbitration Act to extend award deadlines or substitute arbitrators is limited to courts with original civil jurisdiction; absent this, petitions lack merit.
Court extends arbitrator's mandate under Section 29A(5) post-expiry and termination upon sufficient cause, quashing abeyance where delays due to respondent and administration, prioritizing efficient ....
Court extends arbitrator's mandate under Section 29A upon sufficient cause like procedural delays and parties' participation, even post-18 months, to prevent defeating arbitration object by technical....
The purpose of Section 29A of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 is to ensure expeditious disposal of arbitration proceedings and discourage unnecessary adjournments.
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