JUDGMENT :

PRATEEK JALAN, J. (ORAL)

1. By way of the present petition under Section 14 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 [“the Act”], the petitioner-National Highways Authority of India [“NHAI”], seeks termination of the mandate of the learned sole arbitrator who is in seisin of the disputes between the parties under a Contract Agreement dated 29.10.2014 [“the Agreement”].

Submissions of learned counsel for the parties

2. Mr. Manish K. Bishnoi, learned counsel for the petitioner, submits that the arbitrator has been appointed without following the procedure prescribed in the Agreement. The controversy between the parties is outlined in the order of this Court dated 02.12.2022, by which notice was issued to the respondent and a limited ad interim order passed.

3. As noted in the said order, however, Mr. Himanshu Gupta, learned counsel for the respondent, has taken a preliminary objection with regard to the maintainability of the present petition in this Court on the ground of pecuniary jurisdiction. It is the admitted position that the dispute in the arbitration involves a sum of approximately 32 lakhs, whereas the ordinary original civil jurisdiction of this Court is only in respect of disputes of a value of 2 crores or more. Mr. Gupta submits that the “Court” referred in Section 14(2) of the Act must be ascertained with reference to the definition in Section 2(1)(e) thereof, which would render the present petition maintainable before the District Court, and not this Court. He relies in this connection upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in Swadesh Kumar Agarwal vs. Dinesh Kumar Agarwal, (2022) 10 SCC 235.

4. Mr. Bishnoi, on the other hand, submits that the power to terminate the mandate of an arbitrator under Section 14 of the Act, read with Section 15 thereof, also has the potential consequence of substitution of the arbitrator by another arbitrator, which function can be exercised only by the Supreme Court or the High Court, and not by a civil court. He submits that the power of appointment of an arbitrator under Section 11 of the Act has been vested only in the Supreme Court (in the case of international commercial arbitrations) or otherwise in the High Court, which suggests that the power of termination and substitution under Sections 14 and 15 also ought to be exercised only by the said courts. Mr. Bishnoi contends that it is inappropriate to apply the definition in Section 2(1)(e) strictly in such a case. He argues that the word “Court” in Section 14(2) clearly requires a different contextual interpretation, which is permitted by the opening words [“unless the context otherwise requires”] found in Section 2(1) of the Act itself. Mr. Bishnoi draws sustenance for this argument upon the judgment of this Court in DDA vs. Tara Chand Sumit Construction Co., (2020) 269 DLT 373. He draws my attention to the ground taken in paragraph 18N of the petition, wherein the jurisdiction of this Court is sought to be invoked only on the contention that the termination of the mandate of the arbitrator can only be granted by this Court.

Statutory Provisions

5. Before dealing with the respective contentions of the parties in this regard, the relevant provisions of the Act are set out below: -

“2. Definitions.—(1) In this Part, unless the context otherwise requires,-

xxxx xxxx xxxx

(e) “Court” means—

(i) in the case of an arbitration other than international commercial arbitration, the principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction in a district, and includes the High Court in exercise of its ordinary original civil jurisdiction, having jurisdiction to decide the questions forming the subject-matter of the arbitration if the same had been the subject-matter of a suit, but does not include any Civil Court of a grade inferior to such principal Civil Court, or any Court of Small Causes;

(ii) in the case of international commercial arbitration, the High Court in exercise of its ordinary original civil jurisdiction, having jurisdiction to decid