ORDER :

1. This petition styled as being under Section 15 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 [the Act] seeks the appointment of a substitute arbitrator in respect of disputes and differences which arose between parties and emanate from a Memorandum of Understanding [MoU] dated 24 August 2016. The consideration of the issues that stand raised herein do not require the Court to either record or examine the substance of the disputes that arose except to note that it appears to stem from a transaction pertaining to the purchase of 2200 shares of Hero Honda Motors and the claim of the petitioner of payments due from the respondents in connection therewith.

2. For the purposes of sketching out the backdrop in which the present petition came to be preferred before this Court, it is pertinent to note that arbitration is shown to have commenced consequent to the issuance of a notice dated 04 March 2018 referable to Section 21 of the Act. Ultimately and on a petition preferred under Section 11 of the Act which was numbered as Arb. Pet. No. 476/2018, this Court taking notice of Clause 14 in the MoU, by its order of 03 August 2018 proceeded to constitute an Arbitral Tribunal in the following terms:

“Be that as it may, as the existence of the Arbitration Agreement and due invocation thereof had not been denied by the respondents, I see no impediment in appointing a Sole Arbitrator for adjudicating the disputes that have arisen between the parties in relation to the above mentioned MoU. I accordingly appoint Ms. Madhurima Panwar Mridul, Advocate (R/o 18, Tughlak Crescent, New Delhi-110011, Mobile: 9810175151) as a Sole Arbitrator. She will give her disclosure under Section 12 of the Act before entering reference. However, taking note of the submission made by the respondents, the reference shall take effect only after 01.09.2018. Incase the parties are able to amicably resolve their disputes, they shall request the Arbitrator not to enter upon the reference.”

3. As would be evident from a reading of the aforesaid order, parties had been granted the liberty to explore the possibility of settling their disputes failing which the sole arbitrator so appointed was to enter upon the reference after 01 September 2018. It would also be relevant to note that the Court has not been shown any formal notice or communication in terms of which parties may have apprised the sole arbitrator of the aforesaid order. It is in that backdrop that learned counsel for the petitioner contended that the arbitrator may be presumed to have entered reference on or about 02 September 2018.

4. The record would further bear out that by an e mail of 25 September 2021, the sole arbitrator taking cognizance of a statement of claim submitted by the petitioner, called upon parties to appear before it on 04 October 2021 for a preliminary hearing. By a subsequent e mail of 01 October 2021, the sole arbitrator cancelled the scheduled hearing fixed for 04 October 2021 and thereafter provided that the Arbitral Tribunal would convene on 21 October 2021. The matter is thereafter stated to have been adjourned and rescheduled for 22 November 2021. However, and in the meanwhile, the sole arbitrator by an e mail of 29 October 2021 apprised parties that due to personal difficulty, she would be unable to continue as an arbitrator and thus chose to recuse herself from the proceedings. The present petition purporting to be under Section 15 of the Act thereafter came to be filed on or about 09 September 2022.

5. It must and at the outset be stated that the petitioner appears to have approached this Court directly without complying with the mandate of Section 15(2) of the Act. It would be pertinent to note that where an arbitrator withdraws from office and its mandate stands terminated, a substitute arbitrator is to be appointed in accordance with the rules applicable to appointment. The word “rules” as occurring in Section 15(2) has been duly explained by the Supreme Court to mean the a