The court's decision emphasized that the fundamental policy of Indian law encompasses three juristic principles: judicial approach, principles of natural justice, and reasonableness as understood in the sense of the Wednesbury principle.

JUDGMENT

Vibhu Bakhru, J. The petitioner (hereafter `OIL') has filed the present petition seeking review of the order dated 08.09.2021, whereby the petitioner's application [O.M.P.(OS)(COMM) 12/2021] under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (hereafter `the A&C Act') impugning an arbitral award dated 01.09.2020 (hereafter `the impugned award') was partly allowed.

2. The respondent (hereafter `TCI') had commenced the arbitral proceedings for adjudication of its various claims. The Arbitral Tribunal had allowed most of the claims as raised by TCI. The operative/dispositive part of the impugned award is set out below:

"OPERATIVE/DISPOSITIVE SECTION:

A) Claimant is entitled to receive USD 26,19,700/- as part of Claim No.1.

B) Claimant is entitled to payment of USD 3,73,707/- from Respondent as part of Claim No.2.

C) Claimant is entitled to a payment of USD 21,000/- from Respondent as part of Claim No.3.

D) Claimant is entitled to a payment of USD 173,348/- from Respondent as part of Claim No.3A, after adjusting the amount already paid to Claimant, if any.

E) Claimant is entitled to payment of USD 1,00,000/- from Respondent as part of Claim No.4.

F) Claimant's Claim Nos.5 is rejected and dismissed.

G) Claimant is entitled to interest @12% as past, pendete lite and future interest on all the amounts awarded to it under the present arbitration proceedings as under Claim No.6.

H) Claimant is entitled to receive Rs.54,90,000/- from Respondent as costs incurred during the arbitration proceedings as under Claim No.7.

I) All payments in USD to be made under the prevailing rate of exchange on the date of payment and to be made by Respondent within 30 days from the date of receipt of this Award."

3. OIL had assailed the said award by filing the above-captioned application under Section 34 of the A&C Act. The learned senior counsel, who had appeared for OIL in the said application, had confined the challenge to the impugned award on the following grounds that its claims were barred by limitation; that TCI had waived its right to claim any compensation by unconditionally accepting the deferment of deadlines; that the interest awarded was beyond the claims raised by TCI; that the Arbitral Tribunal had erred in awarding pre-award interest on claims other than Claim no.2; and that the Arbitral Tribunal had erred in awarding costs.

4. This Court considered the said contentions and set aside the impugned award to the extent that it had awarded establishment cost of USD 100,000 (Claim no.4) and to the extent that the Arbitral Tribunal had awarded interest (past, pendente lite and future) in excess of 10% per annum.

5. This Court did not accept the contention that the claims raised by TCI were barred by limitation and the impugned award was liable to be set aside under Section 34(2)(b)(ii) of the A&C Act, on that ground.

6. OIL appealed the order dated 08.09.2021 before the Division Bench of this Court [FAO(OS)(COMM) 176/2021 captioned `Oil India Ltd. v. Techno Canada Inc.'] under Section 37(1)(c) of the A&C Act. One of the grounds urged by OIL in the said appeal, was that this Court had not considered the objection regarding the applicability of Standby Day Rates (SDR) and Monthly Rental Charges (MRC) for quantifying the amount payable under Claim No.1. By an order dated 20.12.2021, the Division Bench of this Court dismissed the appeal. However, in view of the submission that OIL's challenge to the quantification of damages - which OIL claimed was argued at length was not considered, the Division Bench granted OIL the liberty to file a review petition notwithstanding that the same would be barred by limitation. Paragraph no.34 of the order dated 20.12.2021 passed by the Division Bench in FAO(OS)(COMM) 176/2021 is set out below:

"34. The next contention of the Ld. Senior counsel for appellant is that the issue of applicability of Standby Date Rate and the Monthly Rental Charges, while quantifying claim no.1, had not been adverted to by