The main legal point established in the judgment is that the prior approval of the Director of Education is mandatory for the termination/removal of an employee of a recognized institution under Section 8(2) of the Delhi School Education Act, 1973, to ensure procedural safeguards and security of tenure for school employees.

JUDGMENT

Jyoti Singh, J. (Oral)

CM APPL. 15001/2023 (for directions, by Respondent No. 1)

1. Present application has been preferred on behalf of Respondent No. 1 for fixing a date of hearing and disposal of the writ petition.

2. Issue notice.

3. Ms. S. Janani, learned counsel accepts notice on behalf of the Petitioner.

4. For the reasons stated in the application, the same is allowed.

5. Writ petition is taken up for hearing today i.e. 27.03.2023.

6. The date of 13.04.2023 stands cancelled.

7. Application is disposed of.

W.P.(C) 13618/2018

8. By this writ petition, Petitioner assails the impugned order dated 11.10.2018 passed by the Delhi School Tribunal (hereinafter referred to as the 'Tribunal') in Appeal No. 69/2016, whereby penalty of termination awarded to the Petitioner was upheld. Writ of mandamus is sought directing Respondent No. 1/ Bala Pritam Guru Harikrishan International Public School (hereinafter referred to as the 'School') to reinstate the Petitioner with all consequential benefits, in accordance with law.

9. Petitioner was appointed as TGT (English) by the School on 01.10.2002. According to the Petitioner, the School was functioning smoothly under the previous Management, however, as soon as the new Board of Management took over in the year 2011, litigation started between the School and its staff. Petitioner had an excellent track record as a Teacher but the trouble started when she demanded that her salary be correctly re-fixed by granting Dearness Allowance, increments and ACP benefits etc. Charge-sheet was issued to the Petitioner on 12.01.2015 which led to initiation of disciplinary proceedings, culminating into penalty of 'termination' vide order dated 19.04.2016.

10. Petitioner challenged the termination order before the Tribunal and amongst other grounds, one of the grounds was that termination order was passed without the prior approval of the Director of Education ('DoE') and reliance was placed on the judgment of the Supreme Court in Raj Kumar v. Director of Education and Others, (2016) 6 SCC 541. Tribunal dismissed the Appeal and held that prior approval under Section 8(2) of the Delhi School Education Act, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as the 'Act') is required only when an employee is legally appointed and terminated on account of some delinquency and not in a case, as the present one, where the appointment itself is illegal and thus null and void.

11. Assailing the findings of the Tribunal, the only point canvassed on behalf of the Petitioner by Ms. Janani is that the termination order is bad in law having been passed without the prior approval of DoE as required under Section 8(2) of the Act and is against the binding dicta of the Supreme Court in Raj Kumar (supra).

12. The question that arises for consideration in the present case is whether the termination order of the Petitioner stands vitiated, having been passed without prior approval of the DoE. Section 8(2) of the Act provides that no employee of a recognized private school shall be dismissed, removed or reduced in rank nor shall his service be otherwise terminated except with the prior approval of the Director of Education. The answer to the question, in my view, is not far to seek as this issue stands decided by the Supreme Court in the case of Raj Kumar (supra). In the said case, this Court dismissed the writ petition challenging the order of the Tribunal and upheld the termination order of Raj Kumar, which was assailed before the Supreme Court. On the basis of the contentions advanced by the parties, the Supreme Court framed four issues arising before the Court for consideration and issue No. (iii), which is relevant for the present case is as follows:

"15.3. (iii) Whether the provision of Section 8(2) of the DSE Act is applicable to the facts of the instant case?"

13. Contention of the Appellant was that Section 8(2) of the Act is a substantive right provided for safeguarding the conditions of service of an employee and te