The main legal point established in the judgment is the interpretation of the concept of 'carries on business' in the context of a plaintiff under Section 134(2) of the Trade Marks Act, 1999 and Section 62(2) of the Copyright Act, 1957, and its application to determine territorial jurisdiction.

JUDGMENT (Oral)

1. This is a revision petition under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC), assailing order dated 1st March 2023, passed by the learned District Judge (Commercial Court) ("the learned Commercial Court"), whereby an application under Order VII Rule 11 of the CPC, filed by the petitioner as the defendant before the learned Commercial Court, has been dismissed. Inasmuch as the application, which stands dismissed by the impugned order, contested the maintainability of the suit instituted by the respondent-plaintiff on the ground of territorial jurisdiction, Mr. Bansal, learned Counsel for the petitioner-defendant frankly acknowledges that the application ought to have been filed under Order VII Rule 10, rather than Order VII Rule 11.

2. Nonetheless, as the issue in question is purely one of law, the Court is not inclined to take any serious view of the misstating of the provision under which the application was formally filed.

3. The issue before this Court is whether CS (Comm) 107/2023 (Sagar Ratna Restaurants Pvt. Ltd. v. S.S. Hospitality), as instituted by the respondent against the petitioner, was maintainable before the learned Commercial Court at Delhi. Mr. Bansal's contention, which stands rejected by the learned Commercial Court, is that the respondent-plaintiff could not have filed the suit at Delhi, but was required to file the suit at Chandigarh. For this purpose, Mr. Bansal relies on para 14 of the decision of a Division Bench of this Court in Ultra Home Construction Pvt. Ltd. v. Purushottam Kumar Chaubey, (2016) 227 DLT 320 (DB), which, to the extent relevant, reads thus:

"14. It is evident from the above observations that the interpretation given to the expression "carries on business" in the context of a defendant under section 20 of the Code has also been employed in the context of a plaintiff under the said sections 134(2) and 62(2). Thus, in addition to the places where suits could be filed under section 20 of the Code, the plaintiff can also institute a suit under the Trade Marks Act, 1999 and the Copyright Act, 1957, as the case may be, by taking advantage of the provisions of section 134(2) or section 62(2), respectively. Both the latter provisions are in pari materia. Under these provisions four situations can be contemplated in the context of the plaintiff being a corporation (which includes a company). First of all, is the case where the plaintiff has a sole office. In such a case, even if the cause of action has arisen at a different place, the plaintiff can institute a suit at the place of the sole office. Next is the case where the plaintiff has a principal office at one place And a subordinate or branch office at another place and the cause of action has arisen at the place of the principal office. In such a case, the plaintiff may sue at the place of the principal office but cannot sue at the place of the subordinate office. The third case is where the plaintiff has a principal office at one place and the cause of action has arisen at the place where its subordinate office is located. In this eventuality, the plaintiff would be deemed to carry on business at the place of his subordinate office and not at the place of the principal office. Thus, the plaintiff could sue at the place of the subordinate office and cannot sue (under the scheme of the provisions of section 134(2) and 62(2)) at the place of the principal office. The fourth case is where the cause of action neither arises at the place of the principal office nor at the place of the subordinate office but at some other place. In this case, the plaintiff would be deemed to carry on business at the place of its principal office and not at the place of the subordinate office. And, consequently, it could institute a suit at the place of its principal office but not at the place of its subordinate office."

(Emphasis supplied)

4. Mr. Bansal's contention is that the present case falls within the third of the four exi