JUDGMENT

V. Kameswar Rao, J. (Oral)

1. The challenge in this petition is to an order dated August 6, 2019 passed by the Central Administrative Tribunal (`Tribunal', for short) in the Original Application being OA 2293/2019 (`OA', for short) whereby the Tribunal had dismissed the OA filed by the petitioner. The challenge in the OA by the petitioner was to the charge sheets dated October 06, 2017 and February 21, 2019 and order of suspension dated January 11, 2019.

2. The facts which lead to the filing of the present petition are that petitioner is working as a Deputy Director (Group `A' post) in the erstwhile Council for Advancement of People's Action in Rural Technology (`CAPART', for short). He had earlier filed an OA 1143/2019 by raising two grounds. The first one was that the then incumbent Director General was only looking after the charge of Director General and as such not competent to issue the charge sheet. The second ground was that the Director General, who was given the look-after charge, was not delegated with the powers of disciplinary authority. The Tribunal rejected the aforesaid OA on both the grounds vide order dated April 09, 2019. However, it was made clear by the Tribunal that in case the petitioner is able to get hold of any material in support of his contentions, then it shall be open to him to take necessary steps in that regard.

3. In the OA being 2293/2019, the case of the petitioner was that the Director General is only a delegatee of the Executive Committee of CAPART and as per clause 36 (c) of the Memorandum of Association of the CAPART, the Executive Committee can delegate its powers to Chairman, Standing Committees, Director General or any other Officer, but the action taken by such authorities shall be subject to confirmation at the next meeting of the Executive Committee. His case was also that the Director General, CAPART did not seek approval of his action as regards initiation of disciplinary proceedings or passing order of suspension from the Executive Committee, let alone, approved by it. One of the contention before the Tribunal was also that the discharge of powers by the Director General was contrary to the law laid down by the Supreme Court in Union of India and Ors. v. B.V. Gopinath, (2014) 1 SCC 351.

4. In so far as the first contention made on behalf of the petitioner by relying upon Clause 36 (c) of the Memoradum of Association is concerned, the Tribunal was of the view that the said Clause applies only when the powers are indeed delegated to the Director General. It was held by the Tribunal that the Director General himself was conferred with the powers of disciplinary authority in the year 2004, through an order dated December 15, 2004. The Tribunal was also of the view that even otherwise the occasion for delegatee to seek approval of the Executive Committee arises only when any action is taken by the Director General as a delegatee. In the disciplinary proceedings, action can be said to have been taken only when the proceedings are dropped or punishment is imposed. On the aforesaid, the contention made on behalf of the petitioner herein was not accepted.

5. Even before us, the submissions made by Dr. K.S. Chauhan, learned Sr. Counsel appearing for the petitioner is almost similar inasmuch as it was his contention that the discharge of powers by the Director General was contrary to Clause 36(c) of the Memorandum of Association as it is stipulated in that clause that the action taken by the delegatee whilst discharging the powers so delegated shall be subject to confirmation at the next meeting of the Executive Committee.

6. He submitted that the Tribunal has wrongly held that the action taken by the Director General, i.e., passing of suspension orders / issuance of charge sheets did not require approval of the Executive Committee. In other words, it is his submission that the Tribunal ignored the fact that such an action was required to be approved by the Executive Committe