The court emphasized the importance of considering the entirety of the reassessment order and relevant judgments in the disposal of the appeal.

JUDGMENT

[Physical Hearing/Hybrid Hearing (as per request)]

Rajiv Shakdher, J. (Oral):

1. Issue notice.

1.1. Mr Abhishek Maratha, learned senior standing counsel, accepts notice on behalf of the respondents/revenue.

2. Given the directions that we propose to pass, Mr Maratha says that he does not wish to file a counter-affidavit in the matter and that he will argue the matter based on the record presently available with the court. Therefore, with the consent of the counsels for the parties, the writ petition is taken up for final hearing and disposal at this stage itself.

3. The core issue, which the petitioner has raised before us is that the impugned assessment order dated 30.12.2017 concerning Assessment Year (AY) 2010-11 is based on an earlier assessment order passed vis-a-vis an entity going by the name `Caruna Bal Vikas. [hereafter referred to as "CBV"]. The contention being that the Assessing Officer (AO) in passing the impugned assessment order has extracted only a part of the reassessment order dated 31.12.2016 passed in the case of CBV.

4. Mr Abhishek Jebraj, who appears on behalf of the petitioner, says that the reassessment order dated 31.12.2016, as it stands today, is intact, although CBV has preferred an appeal qua the same.

5. We may also note that it is not disputed by Mr Abhishek Jebraj, who appears on behalf of the petitioner, that qua the impugned assessment order dated 30.12.2017, a statutory appeal has been preferred, which is pending adjudication.

6. We are told that this appeal was lodged in and about February 2019.

7. Mr Jebraj also submits that the main ground on which exemption under Sections 11 and 12 of the Income Tax Act, 1961 [in short, "Act"] was denied was that the petitioner fell within the purview of Section 13(1)(b) of the Act.

8. Mr Jebraj says that it has been noticed in the reassessment order dated 31.12.2016 (according to him, correctly) that CBV had made a restricted sub-grant in favour of the petitioner and therefore, was exempt from levy of income tax. Mr Jebraj says that this aspect was noticed in paragraph 12 of the reassessment order dated 31.12.2016.

8.1. According to Mr Jebraj, [an aspect which is alluded to hereinabove], paragraph 12 of the of reassessment order dated 31.12.2016 concerning CBV, was not extracted by the AO in the impugned assessment order dated 30.12.2017.

8.2. Furthermore, Mr Jebraj says that the appeal has been pending since February 2019 and, for some reason or the other, has not been taken up for adjudication, causing detriment to the interests of the petitioner.

9. Mr Maratha says that since, concededly, CBV is an entity which has extended a sub-grant to the petitioner, in the ordinary course of things, the petitioner should have known about the reassessment order that was passed in the case of CBV.

9.1. The argument is that the petitioner has approached this court after a long lapse of time. In sum, Mr Maratha says that the petitioner is guilty of delay and laches.

10. We have heard the counsel for the parties.

11. According to us, the grievance of the petitioner is twofold.

11.1. First, the AO in the passing the impugned assessment order dated 30.12.2017 has taken recourse to a part of the reassessment order dated 31.12.2016 passed in the case of CBV.

11.2. Second, respondent no.2, with whom the statutory appeal lies, has not disposed of the appeal, although nearly four and a half years have elapsed.

12. The second grievance answers, to our minds, the objection raised by Mr Maratha with regard to delay and laches. In our opinion, the petitioner in this case was entitled to move the court to nudge respondent no.2 in the right direction.

13. Insofar as the first aspect is concerned, in our opinion, the petitioner is entitled to seek a direction that while disposing of the appeal, respondent no.2 should consider the entirety of the reassessment order dated 31.12.2016 passed in the matter concerning CBV, and the judgments that the petitioner has r