JUDGMENT

Rajiv Shakdher, J.

Prefatory Facts:

1. This appeal is directed against the judgment dated 06.02.2018 rendered by the learned single judge in W.P. (C) 7570/2017.

1.1. The appeal depicts the unrelenting desire of those who control and manage the appellant company, to pursue the restoration of their rights in an immovable property, which came to an end with the determination of the lease, as far back as on 02.09.1972, when the Delhi Development Authority [hereafter referred to as "DDA"] refused to renew the lease.

1.2. The immovable property which is the focus of this pursuit consists of a built-up structure and is located at Plot no.2, Jhandewalan, `E' Scheme, Delhi [hereafter referred to as "subject property"].

1.3. The land underneath the subject property was, to begin with, given on lease by the Delhi Improvement Trust [in short, "DIT"] to, one, Mr Balraj Virmani, via lease deed dated 06.01.1951.

1.4. With the enactment of the Delhi Development Act, 1957, and the consequent constitution of DDA, rights in all properties, both movable and immovable, which vested in the DIT, devolved on DDA, including the subject property.

2. The lease deed executed in favour of Mr Virmani had a tenure of 20 years, which spanned between 11.08.1948 and 10.08.1968.

3. Just before the end of the lease tenure, Mr Virmani approached DDA on 23.02.1967, with a request to renew the lease.

3.1. DDA, in turn, on 09.02.1968 and 16.02.1968, issued notices to Mr Virmani, to show cause as to why the subject lease should not be determined, and the land, together with the building, re-entered, albeit, without compensation, given the various infractions of the terms of the lease, referred to in the said notices, having been committed.

3.2. Notably, Mr Virmani was granted 15 days to rectify the aforementioned breaches.

3.3. Suffice it to say that the breaches pointed out by DDA were grave.

4. Although Mr Virmani did send communications in response to the Show Cause Notice [in short, "SCN"], DDA chose not to respond to the same, and ultimately, via notice dated 02.09.1972, as indicated above, terminated the lease on the grounds indicated in the SCN.

4.1. Mr Virmani reacted by assailing the determination of the lease in a suit action, i.e., Suit No.47/1975, which was decreed in his favour on 07.03.1981.

5. Being aggrieved, DDA preferred an appeal against the said judgment and decree. Its appeal, i.e., RCA No.75/1982, instituted with the learned Additional District Judge, did not meet with success. The appeal was dismissed on 29.09.1982.

6. DDA's second appeal lodged with this court, i.e., RSA No.6/1983, met with the same fate. RSA No.6/1983 was dismissed on 31.05.2011.

7. While RSA No.6/1983 was pending adjudication, the appellant company applied substitution. The prayer for substitution was directed towards Mr Virmani, because of a compromise decree dated 22.07.1988, passed in Suit No.601/1984, preferred by the appellant company against Mr Virmani. The rights in the subject property, it appears, had been transferred by Mr Virmani, in favour of the appellant company.

8. As a matter of fact, a sale deed dated 14.10.1988 was executed by Mr Virmani in favour of the appellant company, whereby the rights in the subject property, which included the building and land underneath, were purportedly transferred in favour of the appellant company.

9. DDA escalated the matter further, by preferring a Special Leave Petition (SLP) against the judgment dated 31.05.2011, passed in RSA No.6/1983.

9.1. The SLP was converted into Civil Appeal No.3783/2016.

10. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and set aside the judgment and decree, passed both by this court as well as the first appellate court. Importantly, while allowing the appeal, the Supreme Court issued the following explicit directions:

"A. The DDA is allowed to take possession of the property in question immediately and dispose of the same in accordance with the provisions of the DD Act read with the relevant