The legal principle established is that the issuance of urbanization notifications does not extinguish the right to institute or continue appeals against final orders under the Land Reforms Act.

JUDGMENT (Oral)

1. Both the present Appeals challenge the judgment dated 04.02.2022, passed by the learned Single Judge in W.P.(C) 7952/2020 & W.P.(C) 7198/2021, by which the learned Single Judge has dismissed the Writ Petitions filed by the Appellants herein.

2. The short question which arises for consideration is as to whether the proceedings under the Land Reforms Act (including Appellate proceedings) would continue after the area in question has been urbanized by issuance of a notification under the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act. The learned Single Judge by the judgment impugned herein has held that the Appellate proceedings would continue even pursuant to the notification under the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act. The learned Single Judge, while dealing with the case has held as under:

"77. The Court thus comes to the conclusion that the right to institute an appeal which stands statutorily conferred or to continue one which remains pending cannot be recognized to be either lost or extinguished merely upon the issuance of notifications under the DMC or the DDA Acts. More fundamentally it would be wholly incorrect to hold that the right to institute or continue appeals stands destroyed once notifications under the DMC or the DDA Acts come to be issued. While with the advent of those notifications, the land ceases to be governed by the provisions of the DLR in "stricto sensu", it does not have the effect of repealing the provisions of the Act as understood in law. The basic consequence that flows from the issuance of those notifications is that the administration and control of that land comes to be governed and regulated by a different statute. If one were to hold otherwise, it would lead to a situation where the owner or occupier would be left bereft of the right to assail an order of eviction or vesting. Similarly, the Gaon Sabha would stand denuded of the right to challenge orders that may suffer from patent illegalities and that may have been passed by authorities while the DLR still applied. For the aforesaid reasons, the Court answers Case 4 holding that the right to institute or continue pending appeals against final orders passed under Section 81 would not stand extinguished merely because the land has in the meanwhile fallen under the control of the DMC or the DDA to be then regulated by the provisions of the respective statutes under which those authorities stand constituted."

3. The summary of conclusions, as given by the learned Single Judge, is as under:

"83. Having traversed this distance and upon consideration of the seminal questions which arose in this batch, the Court in summation records its conclusions as follows:

A. Section 81 is primarily concerned with ensuring that land falling within the ambit of the DLR, is not used for purposes other than those sanctioned under the enactment. The objective underlying the aforesaid provision clearly appears to be to ensure that land as defined under Section 3(13) is not misutilised or diverted to uses other than those permitted under the Act. Additionally, the scheme of the two provisions clearly bears out that proceedings for eviction are statutorily placed in abeyance to enable the occupier to restore the land to its original character. It is only consequent to a failure on the part of the occupier to abide by those directions that eviction and vesting follow.

B. The vesting of the land in the Gaon Sabha consequent to a failure on the part of the occupant to restore the land to its original rural state, proceeds simultaneously with eviction. Vesting as contemplated in Sections 81 and 82 clearly establishes the legislative intent to divest the occupant of all rights claimed in the land and transfer absolute title and interest in the Gaon Sabha. It essentially contemplates the annihilation of the preexisting rights of the owner or occupier.

C. Vesting here is not contemplated as operating in the limited extent of taking over possession but also of the effacement