The main legal point established is that exceptional circumstances, such as a consensual relationship, settlement, marriage, and the birth of children, can influence the court to quash an FIR in the interest of justice and the parties' future.

JUDGMENT

1. Present petition has been filed by petitioner seeking quashing of FIR No.281/2016, dated 29.06.2016 under Section(s) 376/506 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 and Section(s) 4/6 of Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012, P.S. Gandhi Nagar, Delhi and all the proceedings emanating therefrom, in view of the settlement recorded in the form of a Compromise Deed dated 15.02.2023, inter-se the petitioner and respondent no.2.

2. As per FIR, the complainant/prosecutrix was taken to a Doctor after having pain in her stomach and an ultrasound revealed that she was six months pregnant. The aforesaid led to the registration of the FIR, as per which an individual @Rihan, the petitioner herein, had forcefully established physical relations with her.

3. During the course of addressing arguments, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner submits that the complainant/prosecutrix has since married the petitioner on 04.04.2018 i.e., prior to the completion of two years of the registration of the FIR. Not only that, today they are happily living together and have also been blessed with two male children, namely Master Ayan and Master Azhar. Thereafter, he has also handed over a Compromise Deed dated 15.02.2023, which is taken on record, and submits that the complainant/prosecutrix has since settled all her disputes with the petitioner. In fact, both complainant/prosecutrix and the petitioner are present in Court along with their son Master Ayan today.

4. It is in the context of the same that the petitioner and the complainant/prosecutrix have since entered into a settlement and finally approached this Court for quashing of the aforesaid FIR.

5. Notice was issued and Status Report was filed.

6. Learned APP appearing for the State, relying upon the Status Report, submits that since the alleged offence is of a heinous nature, the FIR should not be quashed. However, there is no denial that the complainant/prosecutrix was in a relation with the petitioner and that she is now the legally wedded wife of the petitioner and that they have since been blessed with two minor sons.

7. This Court has heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the documents on record.

8. The complainant/prosecutrix in her cross-examination recorded before the learned ASJ on 18.01.2018, i.e., prior to her marriage with the petitioner has clearly stated that she was in a consensual relationship with the petitioner for a year and that she made a false statement qua the petitioner as he was refusing to marry her and also that she had reduced her age at the behest of her own mother. The relevant extracts thereof are reproduced as under:

"............I was aged about 18 years. I was having affair with accused for about one year. The physical relations between me and accused was with my consent. The complaint was lodged against accused as my family members as well as family members of accused Rehan were against our marriage(Nikah). It is incorrect to suggest that I had lodged the complaint against the accused under the pressure of my parents. It is correct that I had made a complaint against the accused in this case, as he refused to marry with me.........

.......PW1/B and also at the time when you were medically examined and therefore, explain as to on what basis today you stated that you were 181/2 years old at the time of incident? Ans.: My mother had got recorded my age lessor than the actual age in the school."

9. Though it is not of concern, even in the statement of the complainant/prosecutrix under Section 161, Cr.P.C. before the Police and that under Section 311, Cr.P.C. though not on record before this Court, as informed to this Court by the learned counsel for the petitioner, the complainant/prosecutrix on both occasions had affirmed the above. Interestingly, the same has not been denied by the learned APP for the State.

10. In the opinion of this Court, the act committed by the petitioner and the complainant/prosecutrix was i