The discretionary nature of the inherent power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and the need for a full trial to determine negligence before quashing an FIR.

JUDGMENT

Swarana Kanta Sharma, J. By way of present petition filed under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 ('Cr.P.C.'), the petitioner seeks quashing of FIR bearing no. 248/2016 dated 27.05.2016 registered at Police Station Bawana under Sections 287/304A of Indian Penal Code, 1860 ('IPC').

2. Briefly stated, the facts of the present case are that on 27.05.2016, the victim Sh. Ishwarchand had got electrocuted while working at the factory owned by the petitioner, and his friends/co-laborers had taken him to Maharishi Valmiki Hospital. However, watermarkduring the treatment, the victim had passed away, and the concerned staff at the hospital had informed the police officials about the incident. Subsequently, the present FIR had been registered, and a notice under Section 91 Cr.P.C. had been sent to the petitioner, from whom several documents related to the ownership of the factory and the employment details of the deceased had been obtained. After interrogation, the petitioner had been arrested in the present case.After investigation, chargesheet was filed under Sections 287/304A of IPC.

3. Learned counsel for the petitioner has argued that the parties have compromised the matter and respondent no. 2 i.e. wife of deceased, who was also present in the Court, had agreed to quashing of the present FIR as she had agreed to settle all the disputes for a payment/compensation of Rs.9,30,000/- out of which Rs.6,50,000/- had already been received by her.

4. The learned APP for the State has argued that since similar kind of involvement of the petitioner has also been pointed out by the investigating officer, it is not a fit case for quashing of FIR on the basis of compromise. This Court was also not inclined to allow the present petition. Learned counsel for the petitioner thereafter insisted that the matter be heard on merits, and argued that the victim in the present case had unfortunately passed away due to an accident and the petitioner herein could not be held liable for the same as there was no negligence on his part. It was argued that the Co-ordinate Bench of this Court in case of Ajay Agarwal v. State of NCT of Delhi & Anr., Crl.M.C. 2899/2018 had also quashed an FIR registered against the present petitioner on similar allegations, on the basis of compromise, holding a watermarkview that there was nothing on record to show that petitioner was responsible for electrocution of the deceased therein. Thus, it was prayed that present petition be allowed.

5. Learned APP for the State further argued that the death of the victim was caused due to the negligence on part of the petitioner as he had failed to provide any safety gears to his employees and therefore, the present FIR ought not to be quashed.

6. The rival contentions raised on behalf of both sides have been heard and material placed on record has been perused.

7. It was initially contended on behalf of the petitioner that since the dispute has been amicably settled between the petitioner and respondent no. 2 i.e. wife of the deceased, the present FIR registered under Sections 287/304A of IPC can be quashed. During the course of arguments, the learned counsel for petitioner has also relied upon a decision of Co-ordinate Bench of this Court in Ajay Agarwal v. State of NCT of Delhi & Anr., Crl.M.C. 2899/2018, wherein the present petitioner himself was accused of committing a similar offence and the victim had died due to electrocution while working at the same factory of the petitioner, and the Co-ordinate Bench was pleased to quash the FIR.

8. Thus, a perusal of the said decision itself, in fact, reveals that the present case is not the first such incident where a worker working at the factory owned by the petitioner has unfortunately died due to electrocution, but a similar incident had also taken place in the year 2014 i.e. two years prior to the present incident, at the same premises.

9. In the present case, as per prosecution, the petitioner had faile