IMPORTANT POINT
The jurisdiction of the Tribunal is contingent upon the existence of an industrial dispute as defined by the ID Act, and if the dispute is not espoused through a Union, the Tribunal loses jurisdiction to adjudicate the matter.

ORDER

Chandra Dhari Singh, J. (Oral)

1. The instant petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India seeking the following reliefs:

"i) Quash the award dated 10.02.2017 passed by Ld. CGIT-I Delhi in ID No. 159/2011 (old ID No.8/2006) and remit the case to CGIT-I for further adjudication on merit; ALTERNATIVELY/OR

ii) Permit petitioners to file a civil case before appropriate forum/court extending the period of limitation and condoning the delay if any.

iii) Pass any other order(s) as deem fit and proper in the interest of justice."

2. The petitioners in the present case were employees of the respondent no. 2 (`respondent Bank' hereinafter) in the Delhi branch. In the year, 2005, the respondent Bank closed its branches in Delhi and Mumbai and therefore, the services of the petitioners were discharged under the `Early Separation Scheme' (`ESS' hereinafter).

3. Upon discrepancy in the benefits provided to the employees in the Delhi and Mumbai branches, the petitioners raised an industrial dispute before the Assistant Labour Commissioner, which was subsequently referred to the Central Government Industrial Tribunal, Delhi (`CGIT' hereinafter) vide I.D. no. 159/2011.

4. After conclusion of the proceedings, the learned CGIT passed an award dated 10th February, 2017 (`impugned award' hereinafter) thereby holding that the dispute between the parties is not an industrial dispute since the same is not espoused by a Union as mandated under Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (`ID Act' hereinafter).

5. Aggrieved by the aforesaid dismissal, the petitioners have approached this Court by filing the instant petition.

6. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners submitted that the learned CGIT failed to answer the issue on merits, rather simply dismissed the referral on the ground of non-maintainability and therefore, the same is liable to be set aside.

7. It is submitted that the learned CGIT erroneously applied the principle laid down by this Court in the case of Lord Krishna Textile Mills v. Rampal Singh, 2015 SCC OnLine Del 14532 and misinterpreted the ratio of the said case, thereby, leading to the dismissal of the dispute filed by the petitioners herein.

8. It is submitted that the impugned award was adjudicated without touching upon the merits of the case and the learned CGIT merely decided upon the issue of maintainability which is a violation of the principles of natural justice.

9. It is submitted that the learned CGIT failed to give further opportunity to the petitioners to seek an alternate remedy as per the law as provided under Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963.

10. It is also submitted that respondent Bank has again opened their branches in India in the year 2009 and is not recruiting the petitioners back in service, therefore, the said act amounts to retrenchment which is impermissible in law.

11. In light of the foregoing submission, the learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that the present petition be allowed and reliefs be granted, as prayed.

12. Per Contra, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent Bank vehemently opposed the present petition submitting to the effect that the dispute between the parties does not fall within the ambit of industrial dispute as the same is not espoused through a Union or a substantial number of fellow workmen.

13. It is submitted that the learned CGIT rightly held the dispute to be not under the ambit of Section 2(k) of the ID Act as the petitioners failed to produce any evidence to suggest that the said issue was taken up by the Union of the workmen.

14. It is submitted that the statements of the witnesses were completely silent regarding the issue of espousal of the case through their official Union, therefore, leading to dismissal of the dispute.

15. It is submitted that the statement of claim as alleged to be filed on behalf of the General Secretary of the Union is not proven by the petitioners, therefore, the claim of espousal is false and vexa