Judgement

GAJENDRAGADKAR, C.J.I. : The short question of law which arises for our decision in this appeal is whether the order passed by the Delhi Administration referring the dispute between the appellants, the workmen of M/s. Dharampal Premchand Saugandhi and the respondent, the employer M/s. Dharampal Premchand Saugandhi, Delhi, was valid. The order of reference has been passed by the Delhi Administration under Sections 10 (1) (d) and 12 (5) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (No. 14 of 1947) (hereinafter called the Act). When the Industrial Tribunal, Delhi, took up this matter for hearing, the respondent raised a preliminary objection that the reference was invalid inasmuch as the dispute referred to the Tribunal by the impugned order of reference is not an industrial dispute, but is merely an individual dispute which cannot be the subject-matter of a valid reference under S. 10 (1) of the Act. This contention has been upheld by the Tribunal, with the result that the Tribunal has held that it has no jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the merits of the dispute referred to it. It is against this order that the appellants have come to this Court by special leave. On behalf of the appellants, Mr. Sukumar Ghose contends that the view taken by the Tribunal is not sound, and that raises the question as to whether the dispute referred to the Tribunal for its adjudication in the present case can be said to be an industrial dispute within the meaning of S. 2 (k) of the Act.

2. The fact which it is necessary to state for the purpose of dealing with this point are very few and they are not in dispute. The respondent is a firm which carries on business as perfumers and tobacconists in Chandni Chowk, Delhi. On the 28th July, 1961, the respondent passed the impugned order dismissing the service of its 18 employees. On that date, the respondent had in its employment 45 employees. It appears that on the 16th July 1961, the 18 employees who were dismissed by the respondent had become members of the Mercantile Employees Association which is a registered Trade Union in Delhi. On the 29th July 1961, the said Association took up the cause of the dismissed employees and carried the dispute before the Conciliation Officer, Delhi. The conciliation proceedings, however, failed, and at the instance of the Association the present reference was made on the 6th September 1961. It is in the light of these facts that we have to decide whether the dispute referred to the Tribunal for its adjudication is an industrial dispute within the meaning of S.2 (k) of the Act or not.

3. Section 2 (k) defines an "industrial dispute" as meaning any dispute or difference between employers and employers, or between employers and workmen, or between workmen and workmen, which is connected with the employment or non-employment or the terms of employment or with the conditions of labour, of any person. This definition shows that before any dispute raised by any person can be said to be an industrial dispute, it must be shown that it is connected with employment or non-employment of that person. This condition is satisfied in the present case, because the dispute is in relation to the dismissal of 18 workmen, and in that sense, it does relate either to their employment or non-employment. The question, however, still remains whether it is a dispute between employers and workmen. Literally construed, this definition may take within its sweep a dispute between a single workman and his employer, because the plural, in the context, will include the singular. Besides, in the present case, the dispute is in fact between 18 workmen on the one hand, and their employer on the other, and that satisfies the requirement imposed by the fact that the word "workmen" in the context is used in the plural. But the decisions of this Court have consistently taken the view that in order that a dispute between a single employee and his employer should be validly referred under S. 10 of the Act, it i