IMPORTANT POINT
The right to be heard is fundamental; dismissal of a Review Application without a hearing violates natural justice principles.

JUDGMENT :

1. The fulcrum of this writ action is on the question as to whether the Review Application filed under Section 7B of the Employees’ Provident Funds and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952 can be dismissed by the Competent Authority without granting a hearing to the review applicant. I have heard learned counsel for both sides.

2. Briefly stated, the circumstances leading to the present petition are as follows. The petitioner, a registered cooperative society running Panchshila Club was found allegedly in default of provisions of the Act, which led to an inspection carried out by the Enforcement Officer through Shram Suvidha Portal to verify the compliance. The Enforcement Officer proceeded to propose an enquiry under Section 7A of the Act against the petitioner for the period from April, 2016 to July 2016. On the basis of the said enquiry, the present respondent no.1 passed order dated 18.12.2018, thereby determining the liability of the petitioner to pay Rs. 81,947/- as provident fund dues for the said period. Against order dated 18.12.2018, the petitioner preferred a Review Application under Section 7B of the Act. The said Review Application was dismissed by the Competent Authority by way of order dated 25.01.2019, impugned by way of the present writ action.

3. The Review Application was dismissed by the Competent Authority, observing that neither any new facts/evidences nor any supporting documents were enclosed with the Review Application, so the review was liable to be rejected under Section 7B(3) of the Act.

4. Learned counsel for petitioner argues that the impugned order is not sustainable in the eyes of law since no hearing was afforded to the petitioner before passing the same. According to learned counsel for petitioner, the impugned order is liable to be set aside and matter deserves to be remanded to the Competent Authority for fresh decision after hearing the petitioner. In support of his arguments, learned counsel for petitioner places reliance on the judgment of Jharkhand High Court in the case of M/s. Binod Kumar Jain, Bokaro vs Provident Fund Commissioner, EPFO, Ranchi, 2009 SCC OnLine, Jhar 1337. Further, it is contended by learned counsel for petitioner that the impugned order is not a reasoned order, so not sustainable in law.

5. On the other hand, learned counsel for respondents supports the impugned order and contends that the petition is devoid of merits. Learned counsel for respondents argues that not every denial of hearing vitiates the decision insofar as it is only that denial of hearing which causes prejudice vitiates the decision. In the present case, according to learned counsel for respondents, no prejudice was caused to the petitioner. In support of his arguments, learned counsel for respondents places reliance on paragraph no.30(v) of the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Managing Director, ECIL, Hyderabad and Ors. vs B. Karunakar and Ors, (1993) 4 SCC 727.

6. At the outset, for ready reference it would be appropriate, so the provision under Section 7B of the Act is extracted below:

7B. Review of orders passed under section 7A.-

(1) Any person aggrieved by an order made under sub-section

(1) of section 7A, but from which no appeal has been preferred under this Act, and who, from the discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence was not within his knowledge or could not be produced by him at the time when the order was made, or on account of some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record or for any other sufficient reason, desires to obtain a review of such order may apply for a review of that order to the Officer who passed the order:

Provided that such officer may also on his own motion review his order if he is satisfied that it is necessary so to do on any such ground.

(2) Every application for review under sub-section (1) shall be filed in such form and manner and within such time as may be specified in the Scheme.

(3) Where