Arbitral Awards prevail over statutory default provisions regarding interest unless explicitly stated otherwise in the Award.

JUDGMENT

Navin Chawla, J. (Oral)--The appeal has been taken up today as 18.10.2021 was declared a holiday.

2. This appeal has been filed by the appellant challenging the judgment and order dated 06.01.2020 passed by the learned Single Judge of this Court in OMP(ENF.)(COMM.) 2/2018, recording the satisfaction of the Arbitral Award and disposing of the Execution Petition as satisfied.

3. The Arbitral Award dated 29.08.2009 had granted the following reliefs in favour of the appellant:

"A) The Respondent shall pay to the Claimant the sum of USD 6,201,867.00 together with interest at the rate of 6.82985% per annum from 1st December, 2006 until payment.

B) The Respondent shall also pay to the Claimant the sum of Rs.25,00,000/- towards costs.

C) The Respondent shall reimburse the Claimant the Stamp Duty payable on this Award under the law.

D) There shall be an award accordingly."

4. The said Arbitral Award has attained finality with the challenge thereto filed by the respondent being dismissed.

5. The short controversy that remains to be adjudicated now is as to whether the appellant is entitled to claim interest under Section 31 (7)(b) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (hereinafter referred to as the `Act') on the reliefs as granted by the Arbitral Tribunal.

6. It is the case of the appellant that as far as Relief (A) of the Arbitral Award is concerned, the same grants interest only pre-reference and pendente lite. The interest post-award should therefore be computed under Section 31 (7)(b) of the Act and in accordance with the judgment of the Supreme Court in Hyder Consulting (UK) Limited v Governor, State of Orissa, (2015) 2 SCC 189. The appellant claims that accordingly it is entitled to post-award interest at the rate of 6.82985% on the sum awarded, that is, USD 6,201,867.00 plus pre-award interest computed till the date of the award, that is, 29.08.2009.

7. As far as the claim on interest awarded by Relief (B) and (C) is concerned, the appellant claims that as no specific rate of post-award interest has been awarded on the sum payable as costs and stamp duty in terms of the Arbitral Award, the appellant is entitled to interest as specified under Section 31 (7)(b) of the Act.

8. The learned counsel for the appellant, while reiterating the above submissions, places reliance on the judgment of the Supreme Court in Hyder Consulting (supra).

9. We have considered the submission made by the learned counsel for the appellant, however, find no merit in the same. Section 31 (7) of the Act is reproduced herein below:

"31. (7) (a) Unless otherwise agreed by the parties, where and in so far as an arbitral award is for the payment of money, the arbitral tribunal may include in the sum for which the award is made interest, at such rate as it deems reasonable, on the whole or any part of the money, for the whole or any part of the period between the date on which the cause of action arose and the date on which the award is made.

(b) A sum directed to be paid by an arbitral award shall, unless the award otherwise directs, carry interest at the rate of two per cent higher than the current rate of interest prevalent on the date of award, from the date of award to the date of payment. Explanation.-The expression "current rate of interest" shall have the same meaning as assigned to it under clause (b) of section 2 of the Interest Act, 1978 (14 of 1978)."

10. A reading of the above provision would show that, unless otherwise agreed by the parties, a discretion has been vested in the Arbitral Tribunal to grant interest on the `sum directed to be paid under an Award'. Such interest ma