The right to bail is fundamental, with courts required to ensure freedom from arrest unless exceptional circumstances justify denial, especially given the initial bailable nature of the alleged offences.

JUDGMENT

Dinesh Kumar Sharma, J. (Oral)

1. This is an application for grant of anticipatory bail filed under Section 438 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Cr.PC) in FIR No.0406/2022 registered under Section 323/341/506/34 IPC at PS Badarpur.

2. The FIR was lodged on the application of Mr. Sohan s/o Pancha Ram alleging therein that on 05.09.2022 at around 8.30 a.m. while he was going to gym, the accused persons i.e. Harsh Kumar @ Tinku s/o Raj Kumar, Gaurav s/o Rohtash and Rahul s/o Udal came in white colour car and attached him. The accused persons were armed with Danda and iron rods. The complainant alleged that he was assaulted on his hands and legs with iron rod and danda on account of which he suffered injuries and was taken to hospital.

3. Initially, an FIR was lodged under Sections 323/341/506/34. Admittedly, the petitioner was admitted to police bail by the Investigation Officer (IO) as the offences were bailable in nature. It is also not disputed that the petitioner was joining the investigation in pursuance to the notice under Section 41A Cr.PC. However, subsequently, Section 325 IPC was added as the injuries were opined to be grievous in nature. The petitioner instead of attending the investigation, moved an application for anticipatory bail before the learned Sessions Court.

4. In reply to the bail application, IO stated that upon certain materials, which have come on record, Section 195-A IPC has also been added as allegedly the accused persons were threatening the complainant and his mother on different dates. The anticipatory bail application was rejected by the learned sessions court.

5. The petitioner upon rejection of the bail application from Sessions Court has invoked the jurisdiction of this court. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that once the petitioner/accused has been admitted to bail by the police, the only recourse left upon for the investigating agency is to move an application for cancellation of bail. It has been submitted that the petitioner apprehends his arrest upon adding of Section 195-A IPC. Learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that Section 195-A IPC is not at all made out in the present case.

6. Per contra, learned APP for the State has opposed the bail application on the ground that firstly, in the bail application the petitioner has only sought the bail under Sections 323/341/506/34 IPC. Learned APP submits that since bail has not been sought under Sections 325 IPC and 195-A IPC, the bail application itself is defective. Secondly, learned APP has submitted that the petitioner was not granted bail by any court at any point of time and IO has simply admitted the petitioner on police bail as the offences at that time were bailable in nature. Thirdly, learned APP has submitted that recovery of car is yet to be effected and therefore, the IO would be required to do custodial interrogation of the petitioner for recovery of the car and for the offence under Section 195-A IPC.

7. It is an admitted case that the petitioner was admitted to police bail by the IO on 21.11.2022. The incident was of 05.09.2022 however the FIR was lodged on 11.09.2022. Section 325 IPC was added later on. The offence under Section 325 IPC is also bailable in nature. The problem arose when Section 195-A was added which is cognizable and non-bailable. Learned APP for the State has himself stated in the Court that the custodial interrogation of the accused is required. Thus, the apprehension of the petitioner that he may be arrested is well founded.

8. Learned counsel for the petitioner, in support of his contention that once the accused is admitted to bail, cannot be re-arrested unle