The testimony of a child victim in sexual assault cases is sufficient for conviction if credible, highlighting the high standard of reliability required under the POCSO Act.

JUDGMENT :

AMIT MAHAJAN, J.

1. The present appeal has been filed challenging the judgment on conviction dated 27.01.2023 (hereafter ‘the impugned judgment’) and order on sentence dated 11.04.2023 (hereafter ‘the impugned order on sentence’), passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Dwarka Courts, New Delhi, in SC No. 440994/16 arising out of FIR No. 175/2014, registered at Police Station Dwarka North.

2. The learned Trial Court by the impugned judgment has convicted the appellant for offence under Section 6 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (‘POCSO Act’).

3. By the impugned order on sentence, the learned Trial Court has sentenced the appellant to undergo rigorous imprisonment for ten years for the offence under Section 6 of the POCSO Act with a fine of Rs. 30,000/- and in default, simple imprisonment for 30 days.

4. Briefly stated, the FIR in the present case was registered based on the statement of the mother of the victim (5 years old at the time of the incident) alleging that on 14.03.2014, at around 8pm, when her daughter (victim) was not found in the room, she peeped into the room of the accused /appellant, who used to reside at the same floor in a rented premises and saw that the victim was made to hold the penis of the accused in her hand. She alleged that the landlord – Ram Kumar on being informed about the incident, asked them not to report the matter to the police. However, later the victim revealed that the accused inserted his penis into her mouth which led to the registration of the present FIR under Sections 376 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 and Sections 4/6 of the POCSO Act.

5. The victim supported the case of the prosecution in her statement under Section 164 of the CrPC.

6. By order dated 13.05.2014, charges were framed against the appellant for offences under Section 6 read with Section 5(L) of the POCSO Act for committing aggravated penetrative sexual assault upon the child victim.

7. The prosecution cited 9 witnesses in support of its case. The said witnesses included the victim’ mother (PW1) and the child victim (PW2).

8. The appellant denied the allegations in his statement under Section 313 of the CrPC and contested that he was being falsely implicated by the victim’s family members.

9. The learned Trial Court convicted the appellant of the alleged offences by the impugned judgment by taking into consideration the testimony of the prosecution witnesses, especially, the victim and her mother. It was noted that the victim had completely supported the case of the prosecution and her testimony is corroborated by that of her mother. It was observed that the discrepancies in the statements of the victim and her mother were only minor in nature and not fatal to the case of the prosecution.

10. The learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the learned Trial Court erred in not granting benefit of doubt to the appellant and convicting him mechanically without appreciating that the prosecution has been unable to establish its case beyond reasonable doubt and prove the foundational facts.

11. He argued that there is no incriminating medical evidence against the appellant and the learned Trial Court erroneously placed reliance on the version of the victim. He submitted that there is no independent material to corroborate the ver