HARSHA DEVANI, J.

1. By this petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner (original defendant) has called in question the order dated 27.11.2018 passed by the Commercial Court, Ahmedabad below Exhibit 166 filed by the petitioner under section 10 read with section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (hereinafter referred to as “the Code”) in Commercial Civil Suit No.154 of 2016.

2. The respondent (original plaintiff) instituted a suit being Civil Suit No.1360 of 2003 against Bank of Bahrain & Kuwait (also referred to as BBK). Subsequently, the respondent-plaintiff instituted Civil Suit No.3213 of 2004 against the petitioner-defendant, which in turn came to be transferred to the Commercial Court, at Ahmedabad and re-numbered as Commercial Civil Suit No.154 of 2016. By the impugned order dated 27.11.2018, the application below Exhibit 166 came to be dismissed with costs of Rs.50,000/-. Being aggrieved, the petitioner has filed the present petition seeking the relief noted hereinabove.

3. Mr. Mihir Thakore, Senior Advocate, learned counsel with Mr. Anip Gandhi, learned advocate for the petitioner, submitted that the subsequent suit being Commercial Civil Suit No.154 of 2016 is closely connected with the first suit being Civil Suit No.1360 of 2003. According to the learned counsel, even if section 10 of the Code may not be applicable to the facts of the present case; in exercise of inherent powers under section 151 of the Code, stay can still be granted. It was submitted that the present case squarely falls within the ambit of section 151 of the Code and therefore, the Commercial Court was not justified in rejecting the application filed by the petitioner.

3.1 Referring to the application Exhibit 166, it was pointed out that the same has been made under section 10 read with section 151 of the Code and that the powers under section 151 of the Code being wide, the court had ample powers to stay the proceedings of the subsequent suit till the first suit came to be decided.

3.2 In support of such submission, the learned counsel placed reliance upon the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Manohar Lal Chopra v. Rai Bahadur Rao Seth Hiralal, AIR 1962 SC 527, wherein the court held that there is no such expression in section 94 of the Code, which expressly prohibits the issue of a temporary injunction in the circumstances not covered in Order 37 or by any rules made under the Code. It is well settled that the Legislature is incapable of contemplating all the possible circumstances which may arise in future litigation and consequently providing the procedure for them. It was submitted that therefore, even if the present case does not fall within the contingencies provided under section 10 of the Code, the court is not barred from granting relief in exercise of inherent powers under section 151 of the Code.

3.3 Reliance was also placed upon the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Arjun Singh v. Mohindra Kumar, AIR 1964 SC 993, wherein the court held that the inherent power of the court cannot override the express provisions of law. In other words, if there are specific provisions of the Code dealing with a particular topic and they expressly or by necessary implication exhaust the scope of the powers of the court or the jurisdiction that may be exercised in relation to a matter, the inherent power of the court cannot be invoked in order to cut across the powers conferred by the Code. The prohibition contained in the Code, need not be express but may be implied or be implicit from the very nature of the provisions that it makes for covering the contingencies to which it relates.

3.4 Reliance was also placed upon the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Ram Chand and Sons Sugar Mills (P) Ltd. v. Kanhayalal Bhargava, AIR 1966 SC 1899, for the proposition that there is nothing in Order XXIX of the Code, which, expressly or by necessary implication, precludes the exercise of th